

# THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN

*A Quarterly Journal of Philosophy*

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## INTELLECTUAL MEMORY

*Vernon J. Bourke*

## ON THE PURSUIT OF CATHOLIC WISDOM

*John J. O'Brien*

## THE INTERNAL SENSES IN THE PROCESS OF COGNITION

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## THE DETERMINATION OF SUBSTANCE BY ACCIDENTS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF ST. THOMAS

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## NOTES ON PLATO'S CONCEPT OF TIME

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## A LETTER FROM DR. MULLER-THYM

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## Intellectual Memory in the Thomistic Theory of Knowledge

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Agnoseology which accepts a distinction between lower, or sense, cognition and higher, or intellectual, cognition must offer some explanation of the observable retention and recall of knowledge previously acquired on either level. Within the broad confines of Aristotelian philosophy there is no great difficulty in regard to sensitive memory. Sensible forms are retained as individuated images in internal sensation through the functioning of both imagination and sense memory. While there may be some debate as to the need for several separate faculties of internal sensation, it is clear that non-living bodies, even, have the capacity to retain, for at least a time, the forms by which these bodies have previously been actuated.<sup>1</sup> Since all sense potencies function in association with matter, there is no question as to the retentive nature of internal sensation.<sup>2</sup>

### Platonic Theory

Intellectual memory, however, is not easy to explain. There would seem to be two classic theories of higher memory in ancient philosophy. The first finds expression in the *Theaetetus* of Plato<sup>3</sup> and might be called the dove-cote theory. Here, thoughts are compared to birds which may be caught and imprisoned within the box which is the mind. Thus possessed they may be brought out for consideration at any time that the owner can lay hands on them. Sometimes he grabs the appropriate bird, (and

thus succeeds in remembering well); sometimes he catches the wrong bird, (and then he may mistake one remembered thought for another one which he is seeking, though Plato confesses some difficulty in seeing how such mistakes could be made); and sometimes, alas, he grasps thin air, (in which case he says that he has forgotten what he once knew.)

In the theory of St. Augustine this Platonic explanation of memory is tremendously expanded and developed, but it remains a "birds-in-the-box" theory. *Memoria*, as described by Augustine, is co-extensive with the whole soul of man. It even takes in more than the whole conscious mind, for *memoria* includes the subconscious mind and it includes what might be called the super-conscious realm, the *rationes aeternae*, the things of God, even the presence of God in His intimate contacts with the human soul.<sup>4</sup> From the manner in which St. Augustine speaks of *memoria* one gets the impression that it is a vast container of things, things which are far more real than the objects of man's sense experience.<sup>5</sup> It is a world of intelligible realities suggesting at times the Platonic world of Ideas.

It remained for Avicenna to reduce this "box" theory to clarity and so to eventual absurdity. He said that this treasure-house of things intelligible would have to consist either of the essences of these things, or of the *individuated and existing natures* of them (which would make them bodies according to the Avicennian theory of individuation).<sup>6</sup> Avicenna rejects the possibility that these things of intellectual memory may be independent essences and he also thinks that it is impossible for them to be bodies. He is already committed to the view that there is no complete faculty of understanding naturally present in the individual human soul. The soul is potentially capable of

<sup>1</sup> "Si ergo materia corporalis formas, quas recipit, non solum tenet, dum per eas agit in actu, sed etiam postquam per eas agere cessaverit: . . ." S. Thomae, *S. T.* I, 79, 6 c; ed. Leonina, V, 270.

<sup>2</sup> To obviate any misunderstanding, it should be noted that the faculty of simple conservation of sensible species, in the theory of St. Thomas, is *imagination*, whereas *memory* is the faculty which recalls the objects of sensation to actual consideration. "Quinto autem requiritur quod ea quae prius fuerunt apprehensa per sensus, et interius conservata, iterum ad actualem considerationem revocentur. Et hoc quidem pertinet ad memorativam virtutem: . . ." *Quaest. Disp. de Arima*, art. 13 c; *Quaestiones Disputatae*, Taurini-Romae 1931, II, 426b. See the analysis of this distinction between *imagination* and *sense memory* in: Gilson, E., *Le Thomisme*, 3me éd., Paris 1927, pp. 202-203.

<sup>3</sup> "Socrates. We may suppose that the birds are kinds of knowledge, and that when we were children, this receptacle was empty; whenever a man has gotten and detained in the enclosure a kind of knowledge, he may be said to have learned or discovered the thing which is the subject of the knowledge: and this is to know." *Theat.*, 198A seq.; *Dialogues of Plato*, tr. B. Jowett, N. Y. 1937, I, 202-206. (I am not suggesting that this is the only theory of higher memory to be found in Plato; nevertheless it is the view which becomes historically significant in the modifications which it undergoes in Augustinianism and Avicennian thought.)

<sup>4</sup> The classic statement of this teaching is in Augustine's *De Trinitate*, XIV, 6-15; PL 42, 1041-1052.

<sup>5</sup> "Nous sommes surpris de trouver tant de souvenirs conservés en nous, comme si les objets mêmes s'étaient incorporellement transportés dans notre pensée: . . ." Gilson, E., *Introduction à l'étude de S. Augustin*, Paris 1931, p. 133.

<sup>6</sup> "Dicimus nunc de humanis animabus, an ipsa intelligibilia quae apprehendunt, et deinde convertunt se ab illis ad alia, non sint in illis perfecte in effectu, et ideo ipsae non intelligunt ea perfecte in effectu; an habeant thesaurum in quo ea reponant? Sed hic thesaurus, aut est essentia earum, aut corpus earum, aut aliquid corporale earum." Avicennae, *De Anima*, Tract. V, c. 6; see the transcription of the full text from: Avicenne, *Opera*, Venetiis 1508, in Gilson, E., "Pourquoi s. Thomas a critiqué s. Augustin," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, I (1926-7) 43, note 1.

transitory acts of understanding but each of these acts of understanding must be caused by the momentary infusion of intelligible forms from the Active Intelligence which is not a power of the individual soul but a single agency to which every human soul must turn for that "union"<sup>7</sup> in which the soul transcends its native capacities. With such a theory Avicenna must conclude that the human soul cannot retain the intelligible species after it has ceased actual consideration. There is no place for intellectual memory in the philosophy of Avicenna. Or, to put the same thing in another way, the role of intellectual memory is played by the Active Intelligence. All that the individual soul acquires through intellectual study is a *facility* in converting its gaze to the *Dator Formarum*. This facility is an acquisition of the sensory faculties of man. By it, the soul which was in pure potency in regard to actual intellection is advanced to a state of proximate potency.<sup>8</sup> It is like the case of an eye which is made healthy by its first look at something; when it stops looking it retains this acquired health and is able to look again whenever its owner wishes.

#### *Objects Not Actually Intelligible*

In each of his formal discussions of intellectual memory, St. Thomas describes this Avicennian position.<sup>9</sup> His criticism and rejection of this theory always forms the prelude to the exposition of his own doctrine on higher memory. The reason for this methodology is obvious. The theories of knowledge of Plato and Avicenna are basically the same. Both suppose the existence of *actually intelligible* objects of the intellect. In the case of Plato these *intelligibilia* have independent subsistence; for Avicenna they are in the Active Intelligence. In either position the objects of the human intellect are actually intelligible before the human soul discovers them.

"Et sic in hoc Avicenna cum Platone concordat, quod species intelligibiles nostri intellectus efflunt a quibusdam formis separatis, quas tamen Plato dicit per se subsistere, ut refert Aristoteles; Avicenna vero ponit eas in intelligentia agente."<sup>10</sup>

<sup>7</sup>This doctrine of union (*conjunction*: in Arabic it is called *ittisal*) is at once an interpretation of the ambiguous statements in Aristotle, *De Anima*, III, 4-5, and an instance of the Mohammedan religious and mystical teaching on the utter dependence of man on the supra-human spheres for his spiritual actions. Father Rickaby gives some indications of the scope of this doctrine in: *Of God and His Creatures*, St. Louis-London 1905, pp. 142-143, footnotes. It is possible that Rickaby's interpretation overstates the sensitive nature of the human soul according to Avicenna, for the Arab does grant *potential* intellectuality to man and speaks of a *ratio* in the soul, which appears to be on the border-line between the highest grade of sensation and the lowest grade of intellection. See the transcribed text of the *De Anima*, Tract. V, 5; in Gilson, "Pourquoi etc.", loc. cit., p. 41, note 1.

<sup>8</sup>"Cum enim anima conjungitur intelligentiae, emanat ab ea virtus intellectus simplicis, quam sequitur emanatio ordinandi; si vero avertitur a principio, flunt ipsae formae in potentia, sed potentia proxima. Ergo primum discere est sicut oculi curatio, qui factus sanus, cum vult, aspicit aliquid unde sumat aliquam formam. Cum vero avertitur ab illo, fit illud sibi in potentia proxima effectui." *De Anima*, Tract. V, 6.

<sup>9</sup>De Ver. 10. 2c; Turin 1931, 228. Sum. c. Gent. II. 74; ed. Leon. XIII, 469-470. S.T. I. 79. 6c; ed. Leon. V, 270-271. At several other points St. Thomas describes and criticizes the view of Avicenna, notably in: *Quaest. de An.*, art. 15c; Turin 1931, II, 436-437.

The same thing might be said of the theory of St. Augustine; it is at bottom a Platonism in its analysis of higher knowledge, for the *mens* gazes upon objects of understanding which are known independently of sensation.<sup>11</sup>

But St. Thomas cannot admit that the objects of the intellect are presented to it as actual intelligibles. He cannot admit that human science is not caused by sensible things. It makes little difference whether the intelligibles be Ideas in the intelligible world of Plato, or forms in the Active Intelligence of Avicenna. These theories neglect the important role of sensation in the origin of human knowledge.<sup>12</sup> They require one to postulate unnecessary things, either a world of ideas or an agent intelligence.

#### *Habitus Theory of Aristotle*

The second classical theory of intellectual memory owes its primary development to Aristotle and it may be called the *habitus* theory. Aristotle said that the intellective soul is potentially a place for intelligible species (*locus specierum*).<sup>13</sup> He also said that the possible intellect, once actuated by intelligible species, did not return to its original condition of pure, passive potency. After learning something, the intellect does not continue to think of it actively for an indefinite time. When it ceases actual consideration, the intellect again becomes potential in regard to the specific knowledge which it was considering, but it now has a different sort of potency from that which it had in the pre-learning period.<sup>14</sup> One characteristic of this new state of the potency of the intellect is mentioned, as it were, parenthetically by Aristotle: it enables the intellect to re-think what it has previously understood, whenever the agent desires. This is a feature which is considerably stressed by Averroës, the Commentator. He defined *hexis*, or *habitus*, (for these are the Greek and Latin terms used to name this new condition of intellective potency in the post-learning period), as "that whereby its possessor is enabled to understand by his own efforts, whenever he wishes, without requiring any outside help."<sup>15</sup>

#### *Partial Actuations of Possible Intellect*

These suggestions are enough for St. Thomas. He proceeds to develop a theory of higher memory in which intelligible species are retained, not as quasi-physical entities in a box, but as acquired—but partial—actuations of the original potency of the possible intellect.

<sup>10</sup>S.T. I. 84. 4 c; V, 320.

<sup>11</sup>I am aware that Father C. Boyer, (*L'idée de vérité dans la philosophie de s. Aug.*, Paris 1921, pp. 156-220), has valiantly tried to avoid the interpretation of Augustine's theory which I have just suggested. However, Father Boyer's position, that there is a sort of abstraction of intelligible objects from sensible presentations, in Augustinism, flies in the face of numerous texts of St. Augustine and the whole history of Augustinianism. The whole matter is well discussed in: Kälin, B., *Die Erkenntnislehre des hl. Augustinus*, Sarnen 1920, pp. 42 ff.

<sup>12</sup>Sum. c. Gent. II. 74, ad "Sed si diligenter . . .", XIII, 469.

<sup>13</sup>De Anima, III, 4, 429a29.

<sup>14</sup>De Anima, III, 4, 429b7-10.

<sup>15</sup>"haec enim est definitio hujus habitus, scilicet ut habens habitum intelligentem per ipsum illud, quod est sibi proprium ex se, et quando voluerit, absque eo quod indigeat in hoc aliquo extrinseco." Averroës Cordubensis, *Commentarium in Aristotelis De Anima*, III, 3; in Aristotelis, *Opera*, Venetiis apud Juntas, t. VI (1550), fol. 169v, line 22.

"Ex hoc ergo quod recipit species intelligibiliū, habet quod possit operari cum voluerit, non autem quod semper operetur; quia et tunc est quodammodo in potentia, sed aliter quam ante intelligere, eo scilicet modo quo sciens in habitu est in potentia ad considerandum in actu."<sup>16</sup>

Intelligible species are sometimes only potentially present to the intellect; then it is said to be wholly in potency. At other times, these species are completely actuating the intellect, then it is wholly in act. Again, the intelligible species may be present in a condition mid-way between pure potency and complete act, then the possible intellect is said to be in *habitu*. It is in this habitual condition, between potency and act, that the intellect keeps acquired intelligible species when they are not being used in actual understanding.

"species intelligibiles aliquando sunt in intellectu in potentia tantum, et tunc dicitur intellectus esse in potentia; aliquando autem secundum ultimam completionem actus, et tunc intelligit actu; aliquando medio modo se habent inter potentiam et actum, et tunc dicitur esse intellectus in habitu. Et secundum hunc modum intellectus conservat species etiam quando actu non intelligit."<sup>17</sup>

Thus, in terms of the doctrine of potency and act, both the retention and the recall to actual consciousness of intellectual knowledge is explained. The retention of forms by passive potencies in inanimate matter and in sensory agents is an observable fact, and is admitted by Avicenna. Why not also admit the retention of species in the superior passive potency of the human intellect?<sup>18</sup> On the other hand, intellectual recall is the operation, initiated by the will, in which habitual intellectual knowledge is brought back to actuality. The habituation of the intellect by acquired species makes it possible for the learned person actually to understand what he has previously studied, whenever he so desires.

"Quandoque autem species intelligibiles sunt in eo medio modo inter potentiam et actum, scilicet in habitu; et tunc potest intelligere actu quando voluerit."<sup>19</sup>

Such intellectual recall should not, of course, be confused with reminiscence, which is a quasi-syllogistic, intellectually controlled, search for sense knowledges which have been lost from sense memory.<sup>20</sup>

### Not a Separate Faculty

It becomes obvious, then, that no potency separate from that of the possible intellect is necessary for intellectual

<sup>16</sup> S.T. I. 79. 6; V. 270.

<sup>17</sup> S.T. I. 79. 6 ad 3; V. 271. Cf. Sum. c. Gent. II. 74, ad "Intellectus enim possibilis . . .", XIII, 470.

<sup>18</sup> "Cum igitur formae, fluentes in materiam corporalem ab intelligenti agente, secundum ipsum," (i.e. Avicenna), "conserventur in ea, multo magis conservantur in intellectu possibili." Sum. c. Gent. II, 74, XIII, 470.

<sup>19</sup> Quaest. de An., art. 15, ad 17; II, 439a. The phrase, "quando voluerit", is an echo of the Averroistic definition cited above.

<sup>20</sup> Reminiscence is, "quidam motus ad memorandum." (De memoria et reminiscentiam Commentarium, lect. 4; ed. Pirotta, 1928, p. 123, n. 356.) The term of this motus is *memoria* in the sensory order, for

memory in the thomistic theory. The same potency which receives intelligible species also conserves them. "Unde patet quod memoria non est alia potentia ab intellectu. Ad rationem enim potentiae passivae pertinet conservare, sicut et recipere."<sup>21</sup> A distinct faculty of intellectual memory is not only a useless redundancy, it is an impossibility. Intellectual knowledge (*scientia*) is not a collection of intellected entities gathered into a receptacle. It is a habituation of the possible intellect.<sup>22</sup> It is retained as a habitus perfecting the passive potency of the individual intellect. This means that the scientist, in whom intellectual memory is eminently developed, differs from the non-scientist, not in that he carries about with him a mysterious *thesaurus* into which he stuffs knowledges for future use, but in the skill, or habitus, which he has acquired, in reasoning to true conclusions from first principles.

The question may be asked: are the various habitus of science the only specific instances of intellectual memory? It would appear not, though St. Thomas usually turns the discussion of intellectual memory to the case of scientific knowledge. However, retained intelligible species are the formal principles of all the intellectual virtues. "Species autem se habent in virtutibus intellectualibus sicut formales rationes."<sup>23</sup> Hence, prudence, wisdom, art, and even the habitus of first principles (*intellectus principiorum*), all would appear to be examples of the retention and recall of species previously acquired. All these intellectual habitus are formally retained in the future life of the soul. Such retention is possible only because the intellect has this capacity to conserve intelligible species, without any help from the body. "Sed intellectus secundum seipsum est conservativus specierum praeter comitantiam organi corporalis; . . ."<sup>24</sup> Phantasms, which are kept in imagination, are not retained in the separated soul,<sup>25</sup> of course. They constitute the material basis of the intellectual virtues as they are possessed in this life. Hence, apart from supernatural infusion of additional intelligible species, the whole fund of knowledge which the intellect carries with it into a future life is due to intellectual memory.

### Act and Potency

It may also be asked: if the intellectual memory is not a specifically distinct potency, then what is it? The answer in terms of the foregoing exposition of the thomistic theory is that it is, from the point of view of the retention of species, a habitus or plurality of habitus of the possible intellect; from the aspect of the recall to actual consideration, it is an act of the intellective soul, initiated by the will and involving both the agent and potential intellects.

reminiscence proceeds from certain associations in space and time, but it may lead indirectly to intellectual recall of *scientia* as well. (Ibid. p. 122, nn. 353-354.)

<sup>21</sup> S.T. I. 79. 7c; V. 273.

<sup>22</sup> "Sic ergo manifestum est quod scientia est habitus demonstrativus, . . ." In VI Ethic., lect. 3; ed. Pirotta, Turin 1934, p. 383, n. 1149. See the longer discussion of *scientia* as an intellectual virtue, in: S.T. I-II. 57. 2c; VI, 365.

<sup>23</sup> S.T. I-II. 67. 2c; VI, 439.

<sup>24</sup> S.T. I. 79. 6 ad 1; V. 271.

<sup>25</sup> S.T. I-II. 67. 2 ad 1; VI, 440.

To attempt to justify this theory of intellectual memory is beyond the scope of an expository study. Its evaluation would demand a reconsideration of the whole metaphysics of intellectual knowledge, which St. Thomas developed. Ultimately, criticism of it would reduce to a critique of the thomistic theory of act and potency. Perhaps it will suffice to offer as a personal judgment the suggestion that the habitus theory of intellectual memory is the only logically possible explanation of the conservation of intellectual knowledge, if one admits the validity of the general thomistic theory of knowledge. Other explanations seem to be but variations of the dove-cote theory of Plato.

The application of the thomistic theory of higher memory to the practical problem of learning and teaching a science is pretty obvious. Let us consider that demonstrative science which is philosophy. One may attempt to teach it in such a way that the learner will acquire a set of accepted conclusions to important problems. These already formulated conclusions may be retained in the im-

agination and sense memory of the student. Of course they will be accompanied by some already formulated rational justifications. These too can be memorized in the sense potencies of the learner. This is excellent training for the internal senses. It probably involves a certain peripheral stimulation of the intellective processes. Of course it is not philosophy, nor even science; it is a kind of high-grade, psychic psittacosis.

On the other hand, the teacher may try to get his students to reason to some conclusions of their own. This is admitted to be difficult, for though man is essentially a rational animal he usually succeeds in avoiding the exercise of his specific difference. But to reason is to philosophize and to learn by rote is not. The habitus of philosophy cannot be perfected in a student by even the greatest teacher unless the learner is the chief agent in the process. Intellectual memory is the growth of the personal effort of its possessor. The practical problem, then, is to persuade the student of philosophy to put forth such effort.

## On the Pursuit of Catholic Wisdom

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OURS is a day of action, of the practical, of the useful. Knowledge must be ordered immediately to activity; understanding for its own sake is considered sterile; ideas are valuable only as propaganda to stir to action. As Monsignor Fulton Sheen has put it, quoting Goethe, we have changed the beginning of St. John's Gospel to read: "In the beginning was the deed and the deed was with God." Unfortunately this attitude toward life and learning has to a great extent entered even the sacred halls of the university, where it is enthroned as the supreme judge and final arbiter of the curriculum. Even the queens of sacred and natural wisdom are expected to pay it homage. It is the purpose of this paper therefore to try to determine the function of philosophy and speculative religion in Catholic education; to indicate its rightful place in the grand scheme of Christian learning; to express the attitude that both professor and student must have toward them if a truly Catholic Wisdom is to be attained by Catholic education.

### *The Function of Philosophy*

Let us begin with philosophy. Is its function apologetic? Is philosophy to present proofs for the existence of God, of the soul and its immortality, for the other truths of Faith which are the objects of attack from science or outside philosophies? To teach and study philosophy for this end only, is to preordain its teaching and study to failure. First, because it will not be philosophy that is taught; and secondly, because philosophy taught as apologetic must fail even as apologetics. For, either the Catholic student believes the tenets of his religion because God has revealed

this body of truths, and then the apologetics are superfluous; or the faith of the student is weakened by the attacks of science and non-Catholic philosophy. But to such a student, an apologetic philosophy, one that has an end ulterior to the pursuit of truth and wisdom, is suspect and therefore ineffectual to strengthen his wavering faith. This will be especially true, if the utilitarian arguments take the usual form of *argumenta ad hominem* instead of the real, solid arguments that flow from a full and complete philosophical interpretation of reality. Or is it the function of philosophy to discuss and interpret in a Catholic spirit the practical and pressing problems of our day, those especially arising from the prevailing scepticism and scientific theories? Refuting scepticism is about the most negative thing that can be imagined. Professedly to do only that, usually must end in an even deeper scepticism.

The best answer to the problem lies in giving the student a positive philosophical interpretation of reality, an interpretation that is true and consistent and satisfying to the enquiring intellect. We must give something positive and not merely negative. As to the discussion of the present scientific theories; philosophy is to be taught to pupils who are supposedly taking their science in a Catholic school. It would seem that these classes are the place for such discussions of the Catholic viewpoint. What is the work of these Catholic science classes? Must philosophy assume the burden of making an otherwise atheistic and hostile education, negatively Catholic? Such a procedure would seem to suggest the house divided against itself.

True Philosophy simply cannot be a collection of definite answers to important problems of life. It cannot be practical, that is, ordered to a further end, for it is an end in itself. Education, we are told, is a preparation for life. But for what life? The life of the senses, bread and butter, comfort, wealth, station? Answers to pressing problems might be very valuable information but they belong in the realm of knowledge; philosophy is essentially the pursuit of wisdom. Man of course must live his physical and sentient life, and must learn the practical things necessary for that life; but he has a higher life to which the lower is ordered and subordinated. His specific difference is intellect; and hence his end is to know, and his highest end is to know the highest truth. Wisdom is the end of man; it is not a means or useful for his lower needs.

With the Protestant Reformation, life and reality became departmental, disrupted, and disconnected. Religion, science, life, business, art and all the rest came to have nothing to do with each other. Even truth seemed to become multiple and often contradictory. A man could be a good Christian on Sunday morning, and a professed atheist scientifically. Business and art and pleasure had nothing to do with either his Sunday Christianity or his atheistic science. The will was substituted for the intellect, and action and change and progress for their own sakes became the end of all things. We must do and strive, and learn to do and strive by doing and striving. This is progress: action without any ultimate direction, with no reference to the origin, nature, or end of the being that is in action. For this life of action, education must naturally be scientific, based on experience and experimentation, essentially divisible and divided. This is the intellectual atmosphere that we must live in, the atmosphere, unfortunately, that too many American Catholics imbibe. The Catholic who goes to Mass on Sunday, to the sacraments when he has to, but who leads a life otherwise divorced from Catholic principles and according to the principles enunciated above, may be called a practical Catholic; but he is hardly living to the full a vigorous Catholic life. Catholicism is not just a number of beliefs superadded to a disunited life. The truths of Faith must permeate and inform and elevate a whole, integrated intellectual and volitional life. They must reach down and infiltrate into our lowliest thought and action. And therefore Catholic education can not be secular education to which has been added (no matter how completely) a course of Christian doctrine.

#### *The Summa of Catholic Wisdom*

The purpose of Catholic education is to lay the foundation and to begin the development of the full intellectual and supernatural life. "Now this is eternal life, to know Thee, the one true God, and Jesus Christ whom Thou hast sent." The life of an intellectual, spiritual nature is to know the highest wisdom: the all true God and all creatures as finite manifestations of His infinite truth; to love the fathomless goodness of God in Himself and communicated to all things that are; to contemplate the infinite

beauty of all perfection shining forth in the varied and inexhaustible richness of His creation.

This *summa* of Catholic wisdom might thus be briefly expressed: From all eternity there exists a God, subsistent being, eternal and immutable, immense, absolutely simple and infinitely perfect, truth and goodness and beauty itself, all wise, all loving, all powerful, living the fulness of the divine life of intelligence and love and infinite beatitude in the three divine Persons. And in this Godhead there is the Word, the Son of God, the perfect image and manifestation of the divine and infinite riches of God to God. In this Word by which God sees and loves His divine excellence, He also understands the possibility of manifesting this majestic treasure to others besides Himself. "The procession of the Word from the Father", says St. Thomas, "gives both the *ordo* and the *modus* of the procession of creatures from God." And by this all powerful Word, He creates all being, diversified and distinct in its natures and individuals, and yet one in ultimate principle, exemplar, and end; not the perfect unity of simplicity and identification, but the one of composition and order and subordination.

And yet the divine riches of the Word are not exhausted. In that Word He sees, and through that Word He creates, a being that unites in itself all the perfection of the universe; a being that is the very image of God, in that it has intelligence that can look upon this universe and understand its truth, penetrate its mysteries, comprehend its order and its beauty and thus be led to a knowledge of the majesty of God; a being that is capable, through the possession of free will, of loving service and adoration of God and of the possession of His goodness in its participation by the things that are made. But in this creature, man, the likeness to the Word is even more perfect; in him, God's gifts somehow transcend even creaturehood; for He communicates a participation in the very life and nature of Himself, by which man can see God face to face and know Him as He is in Himself, and can love God and be loved by God with the love of friendship: man is by grace a son of God.

And when by sin man destroyed the effects of God's work, disrupted the order of the universe and of himself, God restored His creation; not by again assimilating this masterpiece to His Word, not as an artist merely fashioning the materials to the idea in his mind; but—if that were possible—like an artist who breathes the living idea itself into that masterpiece, so God put His Word into His creation, "and the Word was made flesh and dwelt amongst us". And by that act, creation attained its end in a manner that was far beyond its natural powers to accomplish: it not only extrinsically manifested the perfections of God in a finite manner, and participated and shared in His goodness; it contained the perfect, invisible manifestation and Image of God, the Son of God made flesh. In our created human flesh He lived the life of the Son of God, culminating eventually in the supreme and infinite act of the manifestation and adoration of the Power and the Wisdom of God, the awful sacrifice of Calvary; and that,

after He had provided for its perpetuation and daily renewal in the Eucharist and the Sacrifice of the Mass, wherein we can be partakers also of this supreme act of the Son of God, even as we are sharers of His divine life by sanctifying grace.

### *Integration of Philosophy and Religion*

This *summa*, it is true, is largely taken from the revealed word of God, the presentation of which belongs to the department of religion. But theology and philosophy, though distinct, are not to be separated and divorced. My body and my soul are distinct; but if they are separated, I am dead. The God of revelation is the exact same God of subsistent being and infinite perfection, He who created the world, and nature, and ordered the universe. It is the man of intellect and will, of sensation and sensitive appetite, of vital processes, that is elevated by grace to the sonship of God. Unless philosophy presents a synthesis of being, its principle, its end, its exemplar, its unity, its composition, its order, its subordination, the order and relations in the life of man—the truths of revelation will remain outside of life, detached and inoperative. Only by means of an integrated intellectual life, can these great truths be made to penetrate and inform and elevate and live in every greatest and least act of life, even as the divinity of the Son of God raised the making of a crude plough to the redemption of the world. Only an intellectual soul can participate in the divine life of grace; only a natural intellect can be infused with the virtue of Faith; only natural wisdom can be perfected by the gift of wisdom. And the function of wisdom is to order all things to one; because reality and truth are one, at least by order. Wisdom does not know and understand any reality as isolated, as in itself and absolute; it cognizes all being in all its relations with the sum total of all other reality, as related in cause and end and likeness to the Pure Act of Being; because reality is related to all other being and is a participation in the truth and goodness and beauty of the Absolute.

On the other hand, divorced and separated from speculative religion or theology, philosophy must be incomplete and false and must lead not to natural wisdom but to natural folly. To study a whole thing according to a part is one thing; to study a part, separated and apart, is quite another. Thus to study man in as much as he is body is a good and profitable study; to study the body of man separated from the soul, is not to study man at all. Now as a matter of reality, man was never just a purely natural man and the order of reality was never a purely natural order. Philosophy, though distinct not only specifically but generically from sacred theology, must nevertheless be informed, elevated, and permeated by the latter. Natural wisdom must be completed and corrected by supernatural wisdom or it will be necessarily an incomplete wisdom, and incompleteness and partiality destroy the very nature of a wisdom. As evidence of this, we need but recall not only the incompleteness but the positive errors of the very best of the ancient thinkers. This is the thesis that St. Thomas

has established in his work, the *Contra Gentiles*. Even the work of the great Aristotle only became a living wisdom by the breath of interpretation of the theologian, Thomas. A pagan philosophy must be as fatalistic and as tragic as a pagan art.

### *Pursuit of Wisdom in the University*

The attainment of this Catholic wisdom in all its ultimate perfection is of course impossible in this life; we shall have it only in the Beatific Vision. And therefore the philosopher is not called the wise man but only the lover or the seeker after wisdom. But an ever growing, constant development, evolution, and perfection of that wisdom is the end of human life on earth; all other activities are subordinate to and are ordered to the fullness of that life or they are unworthy of the man. The preparation for and the beginning of the development of this ordered life is the end of Catholic education.

To this end the University has ordered its philosophy and speculative religion courses. The first course is Logic, the object of which is intentional being. This discipline is absolutely necessary for intellectual activity and life. This is followed by the course on metaphysics or the philosophy of being, which, together with its natural flower and completion, Natural Theology, has to do with reality and the act of existence and those things which pertain to being in as much as they are related to the act of being. Herein reality, intelligibility, and knowledge find their common principles; substance, accident, being, becoming, potency and act find their proper relation and order; the multitude of finite creature beings is ordered and subordinated in principle, in exemplar, in end to the one pure act of being, God. This study of being in its various passions of the true, the good, the beautiful, becomes the measure and principle and orderer for the study of mathematics, the philosophy of nature, the natural sciences, the Liberal and the Fine Arts. From the philosophy of nature, man is singled out for special study in the philosophy of man, because of his importance in the universe; for all creatures of the material world are ordered ultimately to God through him and he participates in all the perfections of the visible creation. To order the practical and varied human activity to the prosecution of the intellectual end of man, is the function of Ethics, the philosophy of human action. To complete this phase of the pursuit of wisdom, two other courses are offered: The Survey and the Text Course. The purpose of the first is still further to integrate philosophical speculation; the purpose of the second is to introduce the students at first hand to the wisdom of the Angelic Doctor, in the hope that having tasted of the sweetness of wisdom at its fountainhead, they will continue to drink deeper and deeper throughout life.

Explicitly to raise this philosophy to a Catholic metaphysics and to fuse it with Catholic dogma and the Catholic life of grace into a complete and perfect Catholic wisdom, the department of religion offers two courses in speculative religion: The *Contra Gentiles* of St. Thomas and Christian Asceticism and Mysticism, the latter of

which might be more correctly called "The Principles of Living the Perfect Supernatural Life of Grace."

Nor in this plan is the intellect stressed too much and the training of the will neglected. The best training of the will is through the intellect, since the will can choose only that which is presented as good. Wisdom is the best guide to proper choice; for the man who habitually views reality as a whole, who evaluates things not in themselves but in all their relationships, who sees in things all the goodness that they possess, not more nor less, and precisely why they are good, will love these things in so far as they are lovable; such a man will not so likely be misled by apparent and deceptive good. Of course free will can never be trained away; but most wrong choice is influenced by ignorance and by the limited knowledge of separated and individual good. Catholic wisdom has the highest function in the development of Catholic character, a character that is expected to grow in age and grace and—wisdom.

**NOTE:** Obviously the attainment of the ideal set forth in this philosophy of Catholic education would require a complete and integrated elementary course in philosophy and in speculative religion such as is contained in the *Summa Theologica* of St. Thomas. The parts and order of such an integrated philosophical course would be these: logic, both formal and material, the philosophy of nature, the philosophy of mathematics, metaphysics and its natural flowering, natural theology, the study of the pure

Act of Being, and ethics. The economy of an undergraduate curriculum, however, can allot but a limited number of hours to the study of philosophy and religion; hence upon these departments devolves the necessity of a wise choice and ordering of courses. An attempt to meet this requirement has been made by the department of philosophy of St. Louis University in the following plan and order of its philosophy courses: The Logic of correct and true predication; The Philosophy of Being; The Philosophy of Man; General and Individual Ethics; a Survey of Systematic Philosophy; Natural Theology; and Philosophical Sources, or the study of the text of a work of St. Thomas. As the necessary theological completion of this philosophy course, the department of religion offers two courses in speculative religion: first, the *Contra Gentiles*, in which the text is St. Thomas' work; the order of presentation, that of the *Summa Theologica*; the elements stressed, the summa of Catholic dogma, the summa of Catholic metaphysics, Catholic life, and the summa of Catholic wisdom; secondly, *The Principles of Christian Asceticism*, a study of the principles involved in the perfect living of the supernatural life. This course treats of God's part and our part in this supernatural life. In outline this course follows the plan of the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius Loyola, into which has been fitted the doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas on the spiritual life, which doctrine is taken principally from the *Summa Theologica* and from the opusculum, *De Perfectione Vitae Spiritualis*. These are the courses discussed in the last part of this paper.

## The Internal Senses in the Process of Cognition

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WHAT takes place when we learn? This is a very interesting question for all classes and conditions of men; it is a question of special importance for philosophers, psychologists, and educators. It can be answered in a variety of ways, from several points of view: there is the metaphysics of knowledge, that is, the philosophical study of the object as known; there is the psychology of knowledge, the philosophical study of the subject as knowing; there is the technique of knowledge, the practical study of the methods of learning. Each of these three answers has its own importance; the first two are mutually complementary requisites for the understanding of cognition. For, knowledge of the human order is a relation between two terms: the subject and the object; a relation of a very special kind, it is true; yet, like any other relation, it demands, for its full understanding, a knowledge of its terms.

The metaphysics of the *verum*, of the object as such, has received much attention, even though at times it has been studied only by the way and in a desultory fashion. But

knowledge, as a psychological reality, has never been adequately treated as a whole. In recent years the study of external sensation has gone on apace, while the study of knowledge in its full flowering has always been cultivated—we owe some of our finest analyses of the nature of intellection to St. Thomas.<sup>1</sup> The intervening process, however, has been more scantily treated. Aristotle<sup>2</sup> makes but two short references to the psychological genesis of knowledge; St. Thomas, in his commentaries on these passages,<sup>3</sup> expands the discussion somewhat, building, we may be sure, on the work of the Arabs.<sup>4</sup> St. Augustine's beautiful pages on knowledge and *memoria* are concerned

<sup>1</sup> It is for this reason that St. Thomas can be called one of the greatest of psychologists: C. Spearman, *Psychology down the ages* (London: Macmillan, 1937: 2 volumes), I, 300-316, 183.

<sup>2</sup> *Posterior Analytics* B 19, 100a; *Metaphysics* A 1, 980.

<sup>3</sup> *In II. Anal. Post.*, lect. 20 *a medio*, and *in I. Meta.*, lect. 1.

<sup>4</sup> Harry Austryn Wolfson, "The Internal Senses in Latin, Arabic and Hebrew Philosophic Texts," *Harvard Theological Review* XXVIII (1935), 115, 121-122.

almost completely with the object of these powers. Later philosophers tend to neglect the psychological angle altogether, until post-Cartesian times. Suddenly then we find dozen of works on the human intellect and the origins of knowledge. But here in many cases the psychological description is twisted into a critique of knowledge, as in Hume and the Kantians. Wundt, Titchener, and their followers—even, at times the Gestalt psychologists—slip into this error. Because of this tendency we find it necessary to insist that the psychological genetic account of knowledge is not a metaphysics of knowledge, much less a critique in the post-Kantian sense.

The question we have asked ourselves really involves four separate questions: two dealing with concepts, two with judgments. For, we can ask about the origin of primitive or first concepts and judgments, and about the origin of derived or secondary concepts and judgments. The latter set of questions is not covered in the scope of this article. One further qualification is in order: the birth of knowledge in the baby is conditioned temporally by the maturation of his physical structure, particularly of the central nervous system. Since we know nothing about this maturation except that apparently it goes on for some time after the beginning of sense experience, we might as well not talk about it, beyond remarking that progress from one step to another cannot be made until the appropriate organ is in full working order.

#### *Sensation and its First Synthesis*

The first act of cognition is sensation.<sup>5</sup> The sensory activity, as it is found in sight or hearing or touch,<sup>6</sup> is a kind of incomplete knowledge; naturally and normally this activity terminates in the first synthetic sense.<sup>7</sup> This sense power is called "common sense" (*sensus communis*).<sup>8</sup> Its object comprehends the objects of all the exterior senses and of the imagination,<sup>9</sup> for it is the power by which we know sensitively that we sense or imagine, and tell the difference between the acts of the various senses, and between them and the images born of the imagination.<sup>10</sup> In the unification brought about by the termination of all the senses in the common sense we find the primary synthesis. It is this synthesis which the Gestalt psychologists have chosen for their own field of work.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>5</sup> It does not seem necessary to delay on this statement, nor to insist that sensation is the act of a living bodily organ, merely on account of certain *a priori* notions to the contrary. That it is necessary for human knowledge to begin in this way, in view of man's nature, has been beautifully shown by St. Thomas. S. T. I.89.1c; Sum. c. Gent. II.68-70. 90.

<sup>6</sup> We must keep in mind that the knowing subject is *man*; that the faculties are only instruments, powers, of the subject. So, when we say, for example, "the imagination forms" this is by way of a kind of "mental shorthand" and not because we hypostatize the imagination or any other faculty.

<sup>7</sup> In *III. de An.*, lect. 12 (in the edition of Fr. Pirotta no. 773). This edition of the Commentary on the *De Anima* will be used.

<sup>8</sup> S.T. I.1.3 ad 2; I.78.4 ad 1, 2; in *III. de An.*, lect. 12 (774); *De Ver.* 18.8 ad 5.

<sup>9</sup> Bernard J. Muller-Thym, "The Common Sense, Perfection of the Order of Pure Sensibility," *The Thomist* II (1940), 340-341.

<sup>10</sup> S.T., I.78.4 ad 2; I.84.8 ad 2.

<sup>11</sup> It is indeed commonly said that Gestalt psychology is the psychology of perception. But, as we hope to show, perception is a more

We find illustrations of these conclusions in certain pathological disturbances. At times a patient can see, for example, colors, lines, and the like, but cannot put together these sensory qualities into a unit.<sup>12</sup> Again, the phenomena of sleep and hypnotism, in both of which sensation occurs without perception and even without any sensory discrimination between sensation and image,<sup>13</sup> point to a primary synthesis in normal perception that is a unitary (because unifying) function.

#### *The Imagination*

The primary synthesis is definitely a unification of sensations, among themselves and later on with images, which lasts only as long as actual sensation is taking place. There is another power in man, which we call the imagination, by which he preserves within himself the images corresponding to the synthesized sensations. We know that sensations are preserved as images, because there are times and occasions when these images come back to full consciousness: when we *imagine* something. Imagining can take place in three general fashions: (1) according to the proper laws of the imagination, (2) in harmony with the function of memory in the strict sense, and (3) in obedience to the direction of reason. The first function is likely to take place when the imagination is otherwise unoccupied, as we experience when we day dream; it can be initiated by obscure sensations or by the physiological mechanism. This is the function which Shakespeare refers to: "The lunatic, the lover, and the poet, are of imagination all compact." Likewise, it is the function of which Moore says that it is the most fruitful source of error.<sup>14</sup> The activity mentioned in the third place, as occurring in obedience to the direction of reason for the sake of understanding something,<sup>15</sup> is a function that can take place only after the acquirement of intellectual knowledge, and so is beyond our present interest.

The second function, however, is the important one as far as acquirement of knowledge is concerned. For, under the direction of memory, the fleeting and kaleidoscopic sensory impressions can be built up into stable representations at long last susceptible to intellectual interpretation and thus capable of being in their own way (in dependence upon the agent intellect, of course, but this latter is in no way an experiential datum, though it is a most important psychological factor), the immediate progenitors of the first concepts and judgments.

#### *The Growth of Secondary Stable Units*

But when we analyze this evolution of sensory knowledge, we discover a new factor, a function that seems to

complicated process than the apprehensions of figure and ground, or of movement, and the like. Gestalt deals with a stage or moment in perception; it makes use of a kind of abstraction; it focuses the attention and thereby limits its scope.

<sup>12</sup> See the summary of the case as given in Dom Thomas Verner Moore, "Gestalt Psychology and Scholastic Philosophy," *The New Scholasticism* VII (1933) 298-325, VIII (1934) 46-80. Pp. 59-64.

<sup>13</sup> S.T. I.84.8c.

<sup>14</sup> Thomas Verner Moore, "The Scholastic Theory of Perception," *The New Scholasticism* VII (1933), 238.

<sup>15</sup> *In ordine ad id quod est intelligendum*, S.T. II-II.173.2c.

be of the greatest importance in the process we are studying. It crowns the sensory level, and mediates between sensation and sensory impulses. For, we find in ourselves a spontaneous awareness of certain sensible objects as suited to our sensory nature, of others as unsuited. (This is not an intellectual apprehension of good, or useful, or evil, as such.) This sensory cognition is not of the order of judgment; it is merely a conscious reaction conditioned by the very structure of our nervous system. Consequent upon this estimation of suitability or unsuitability are the feelings of desire, fear, satisfaction, which in their turn lead to action (though in man, after the awakening of reason, there is a higher order of powers controlling these sensory impulses). The final synthesis, or unification, then, is a function of the "cognizant" power<sup>16</sup> (the *vis cogitativa*) which discriminates objects only in their relation to us.<sup>17</sup>

In the lower forms of animal life there is no imagination (as a distinct power) and practically no variation in activity. As we ascend the scale of complexity, we find instinctive activity less determined by structure and more determined by cognition.<sup>18</sup> But even in the highest animals, the perception of value, of the *conveniens* and *nocivum*,<sup>19</sup> is spontaneous and immediate, even when the activities to carry this out are cognitively determined. In man, however, the power corresponding to the animal's perception of value is itself partly indeterminate, and arrives at its proper perception only by a sort of comparing of individual instances.<sup>20</sup> Thus, the cognizant sense in man is directed toward the sensory apprehension of value on the sense level, but it does this in a discursive fashion,<sup>21</sup> moving from one singular instance to another, and only gradually coming to that which the animal would grasp spontaneously, but in a more limited manner. The cognizant sense initiates the secondary synthesis by its perception of the advantageous and the harmful;<sup>22</sup> this perception brings the whole experience into close union with the person.

<sup>16</sup> I so designate the *vis cogitativa* or *ratio particularis*, because literal translations of these Latin terms convey either no meaning at all or a wrong one to those who do not know the Latin. "Aestimative sense" might describe the functions of this power quite well, except that its historical associations restrict it to animals.

<sup>17</sup> *In ordine ad nos*, which is the limit of discrimination of the sense powers; only the intellect can grasp the object in its ontological constituents and relationships.

<sup>18</sup> William McDougall, *An Outline of Psychology*<sup>3</sup> (London: Methuen, 1926), pp. 98-99.

<sup>19</sup> F. Buitendijk, *Psychologie des animaux* (Paris: Payot, 1928), p. 75.

<sup>20</sup> Quod enim animal imaginatur formas apprehensas per sensum, hoc est de natura sensitivae apprehensionis secundum se; sed quod apprehendat illas intentiones quae non cadunt sub sensu, sicut amicitiam, odium, et huiusmodi, hoc est sensitivae partis secundum quod attingit rationem. Unde pars illa in hominibus in quibus est perfectior propter coniunctionem ad animam rationalem, dicitur ratio particularis, quia confert de intentionibus particularibus. 3 Sent., d.26, 1. 2c.

<sup>21</sup> "Discursive" which usually refers to reason, denotes, not a power, but a mode of activity, and so can apply to this sense power. Compare: "Nam alia animalia percipiunt huiusmodi intentiones solum naturali quodam instinctu, homo autem per quandam collationem" 1.78.4; cf. also I-II. 74.3 ad 1, 30.3 ad 3; 4 Sent. d.23, 2. 2. 1 ad 3.

<sup>22</sup> Some Thomists seem to say that the *vis cogitativa* apprehends the singular *nature* as such. This doctrine is apparently based on

Once personalized, the sense experience becomes the proper object of memory, for "memory is the storehouse of cognitions received with sensation, but not cognized by the sense."<sup>23</sup> We can see the truth of this statement in animals, says St. Thomas, because "the point from which the animal begins to remember is one of these cognitions,

statements of St. Thomas like: "For the *cogitativa* apprehends the individual, as existing under a common nature (*ut existens sub natura communi*) . . . whence it knows this man in so far as he is this man" (*In II. de An.*, lect. 13, no. 398) and "(It is a function) of the universal reason, which says that such an one ought to do such, as, a son ought to honor his parents. But the *ratio particularis* says that this is such, and I am such, for example, that I am a son, and I ought now to give this honor to this parent" (*In III. de An.*, lect. 16, no. 845.).

But the latter statement can be countered with this: "And so the intellect through the intelligible species directly understands the universal; but indirectly the singulars, of which there are phantasms. And in this way it forms the proposition: 'Socrates is a man.'" (S.T. I.86.1).

In view of this apparent divergence of opinion, and to substantiate beyond cavil the position of this article, St. Thomas is called on for a definitive statement: "For the perfect knowledge of the sensory order . . . there is necessary, in the fourth place, that there be certain cognitions, which the external senses do not grasp, such as the harmful, the useful, and the like. And to the knowledge of these men comes by seeking and comparing; but other animals by a certain natural instinct . . . For this end, other animals have a natural estimation, but man the *vis cogitativa*, which compares particular cognitions, and so it is called also *ratio particularis* and *intellectus passivus*. . . . but the movement of memory is according to the movement of the soul toward things (i.e., bound up with sense appetite)" (*Ad perfectam autem sensus cognitionem . . . quarto autem requirunt intentiones aliquae quas sensus non apprehendit, sicut nocivum et utile et alia huiusmodi. Et ad haec quidem cognoscenda pervenit homo inquirendo et conferendo; alia vero animalia quodam naturali instinctu . . . unde ad hoc in aliis animalibus ordinatur aestimativa naturalis, in homine autem vis cogitativa, quae est collativa intentionum particularium: unde et ratio particularis dicitur, et intellectus passivus . . . actus autem memorativae potentiae est e contrario secundum motum ab anima ad res.*) (*Quaest. de An.*, art. 13c). Other remarks which suppose this latter interpretation can be found in S.T. I.82.3, I.78.4, and ad 5; II-II.47.3 ad 3.

To settle this question, we must distinguish. Just as there are three functions of the imagination (see above), and three ways of remembering: by intellectual memory, by sense memory, and by *reminiscientia*, which is a complex act in which both intellect and sense power are active, so there are three ways of knowing the singular: (1) intellectually, but indirectly, as explained by St. Thomas; (2) sensitively, according to the convenient and the harmful; (3) by a complex act of the intellect and the cognizant sense, as is to be understood in the first two quotations of this note. Cornelio Fabro, "Knowledge and Perception" *The New Scholasticism* XII (1938), 337-365, in the midst of an otherwise excellent discussion of the cognizant sense, fails (pp. 351-352) to make these distinctions.

There are then two distinguishable kinds of activity of the cognizant sense: after the intellect has been actuated, and before. After the intellect has once been put into act, it can direct, modify, and extend the activity of this sense—this is the *refluentia* spoken of by St. Thomas, the reaction of the intellect upon and with the sense gives quite a reasonable meaning of the elevation of the latter power.

But in the first acquiring of knowledge, this reaction is as yet impossible. Hence, at this stage, the cognizant sense acts only according to its proper functions: in virtue of its structure as an organic sense power, it apprehends the individual as individual, not immediately, but by a discursive movement in which the important moments are the experimental perceptions of value (*conveniens* and *nocivum*). In virtue of its proximity to the intellect, this apprehension contains the *natura communis* actually but not cognitively. The common nature, though actually present, is only potentially intelligible; it is rendered actually intelligible by the agent intellect whose function it is to "abstract". (For the best notion of this abstraction, see S.T. I.85.1 ad 3.)

<sup>23</sup> 1 Sent. d.3.4. 1 ad 2; also S.T. I.78.4.

for example, that something is harmful or suitable." And in men we can find other indications that memory is consequent upon the cognizance of value. Thus, amnesia can be the direct result of an emotional disturbance—a fact which is well known to all students of psychopathology. Now, an emotional disorientation could not block out whole fields from effective recall, unless memory had some connection with the emotions. We can find another sign of this relation in the fact that interest is a condition of successful learning. Men "must become interested and emotionally affected toward the things they wish to learn, because the more something is impressed in the soul, the less easily will it slip away."<sup>24</sup> It makes no difference for our point, whether this interest arise from the subject itself (the meaning to which the name is usually restricted in the Education books), or from the teacher or associates, or from the consideration of duty, utility, and the like. In all these cases there is a personalization of the experience by means of cognizance of suitability which bears an immediate relation to emotion.

One experience, impressed into the memory by the cognizant sense, serves as a focal point around which other similar experiences can gather. The analogy drawn by Aristotle<sup>25</sup> is still of value. Let us suppose an army in full rout. Suddenly one of the fleeing soldiers turns to do battle again. Then another, seeing him, draws up to his side. Soon there is a new formation of the army about this one steadfast soldier. So, too, in the acquirement of knowledge. Sensory impressions, with a certain amount of unity it is true, pass through sense awareness with a bewildering rapidity. There is a constant shifting about; in this stage sense awareness has been well compared to a flooded river. But in the course of all this confusion, there comes an experience which is recognized as having a suitability for the person. At once the organism reacts to it as a whole, and that experience is impressed consequently upon the memory. Later that experience is repeated again, in a slightly different form, but with enough likeness to meet with a similar reaction under similar circumstances. When this happens, the memory comes into play, modifying, completing, and making firm the image received into the imagination.

#### Sensory cognition: Perception

Once the three powers of imagination, memory, and the cognizant sense supervene upon the primary synthesis of the common sense, we can have the secondary, complete synthesis known as perception. For the cognizant sense unifies the combined data of the common sense, the imagination, and the memory, relating the object of sensation to its situation as a whole, as in the first instance, and to other experiences.<sup>26</sup> Pathology again throws light upon the correctness of this interpretation. For we find patients who experience the primary sensory synthesis, but cannot

make the secondary integration which is a condition of intellectual understanding. Again, in patients born blind because of a cataract and restored to full vision after they have acquired the use of reason, we find the primary synthesis present, for the things they see are clearly configured; yet, the configurations are "meaningless"—they cannot even be related to the intellectual understanding already present, until they are integrated with the rest of the patient's sensory experience.<sup>27</sup>

Thus, from sense through memory (and so by repetition) there arises perception, the *experimentum* of St. Thomas.<sup>28</sup> Does each separately experienced event have to come to separate consciousness in each repetition? We see no reason for this, nor any evidence; rather, both reason and evidence point the other way. In every repetition of the experience, the sum of the previous modifies the present image and so enters into a unit. Consequently, the former experiences are present effectively (*effective, non formaliter*); were they present only individually, there would be no unit of stability to serve as a basis of intellectual interpretation, and we would be forced, as Moore says,<sup>29</sup> to conjure up all sorts of past images. Of course, images of past experiences as such may arise as separate and distinct, and there are times when they do in everyone's case. But perception can take place without such distinct images, provided that some images are present effectively.

From the fully accomplished perception, which can even be called a "quasi-universal" or "implicitly universal" knowledge, because in a way it includes a number of singular experiences, there arises the strictly universal and abstract knowledge which is the act of the intellect.<sup>30</sup> The first concepts will naturally be quite general; later concepts will become more determinate, more specialized, in line with the law that intellectual knowledge proceeds from the general to the particular by intrinsic differentiation.<sup>31</sup>

In connection with the explanation of perception as a personalized integration of past and present, the practice of teachers will both illuminate and be illumined. For, successful teachers have a way of presenting new points to their pupils in such a way that they bring out and even stress connections and similarities to matter already known—they help the child to have not just a perception of words, but a perception of what is shown him; they aid the child in producing in a short time the equivalent of an *experimentum* which it would take the child many experiences to attain.

It may happen that the full elaboration of the image takes place only after the object has gone from the apprehension of sense. In this case the concept could be formed

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, 55-64.

<sup>28</sup> See note 3, and also *In IV Meta.*, lect. 6.

<sup>29</sup> Moore, "The Scholastic Theory of Perception," loc. cit. p. 237.

<sup>30</sup> Fabro, op. cit., p. 345.

<sup>31</sup> S.T., I.85.3; see also Jean Piaget, *The Language and Thought of the Child* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1926), pp. 131, 150.

<sup>32</sup> P. Hoenen, S.J., "Die ordeelstheorie van Thomas van Aquino, II Oordeel en existentie," *Bijdragen der Nederlandsche Jezuïeten* III (1940), 73-110.

<sup>24</sup> S.T. II-II.49.1 ad 2.

<sup>25</sup> *Posterior Analytics* B 19, 100.

<sup>26</sup> Moore, "Gestalt Psychology and Scholastic Philosophy," loc. cit. vol. 8, pp. 64-65.

from the elaborated image alone, since the concept touches only the "whatness" of things. The judgment, however, touches in some way or other existence.<sup>32</sup> Hence, it seems that the first judgments do not arise from the elaborated phantasm in the absence of the object, but only from the perception taken to include in its integration some actual sensation. The senses are not the means by which we know actually existing things, but they are the only faculties by which we come into contact with the things which we grasp by the intellect in judging.

In the very beginning of the movement from sense to

understanding, there is an immanent tendency toward intelligibility. In the sense already there is a kind of "abstraction," for the form of the object is received without its matter. In the internal senses, there is a double simultaneous movement towards unity and abstraction. The important moments of this process are centered around the perceptions of value. At the culmination of this process stands sense-perception (sometimes merely the elaborated phantasm), which, in subordination to the agent intellect (after the manner of an instrumental cause), produces the actual intelligible.

## The Determination of Substance by Accidents in the Philosophy of St. Thomas

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**T**O DENY one of the major principles in the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas is tantamount to denying the whole organic unity. So closely interwoven are the premises of one argument with the conclusion of another, so constant is he in his appeal to first principles, so closely is the whole philosophy bound up with the co-principles of potency and act that the acceptance of one conclusion demands the acceptance of a host of others, while a denial of one vitiates the power of numberless other arguments. Potency and act, matter and form, essence and existence—they are not merely so many theses to be conveniently pigeonholed and taken out for inspection when needed. Rather they are the enunciation of principles upon which is based an entire metaphysics, and without which we can find no satisfactory explanation for a body of conclusions which are the property of Scholastic Philosophy.

There is no eclecticism here. It is the all or none law. Either we accept Thomism as a whole or we do not accept any part of it. If, for example, we choose to reject the necessary distinction of the principles of potency and act we are forced to deny St. Thomas' solution for the problem of matter and form, the analogy of being, the principle of individuation, the theory of intellection, and any number of others. If we reject this point of paramount importance, most certainly we cannot follow St. Thomas in his explanation of the union of substance and accident. It is to show the application of the potency and act theory to the union of substance with its accidents that this article is written.

If we are going to follow St. Thomas in our theory of substance and accidents, we are forced with him to explain it by means of the principles of potency and act. But it is important to note from the outset that when potency and act are invoked to explain the composition of different grades of being, such as the existential or the operative,

they are taken in an analogous sense. They apply to the two cases in a sense which is partly the same and partly different.<sup>1</sup>

With regard to substantial form which is act, prime matter is potency (it is pure potency in every order). The matter and form which combine to constitute an essence together form the potency for the act of esse by which an essence exists. Once a substance exists it is in further potency to operation. Herein we have a further application of potency and act in the substance which is in potency to its accidental perfections or acts. But here we run into difficulties which did not meet us before.<sup>2</sup> Prime matter is a real principle but apart from its form it is nothing; the act is received by a potency which has no independent reality. An essence is a real, subjective potency but has no actuality apart from its act which is esse. But, although substance is really in potency to accidental forms which are its acts, although it is the subject which receives them and without which they cannot naturally exist, yet, unlike the other instances of potency and act, the potency can exist prior to any particular act. While in the others act is that which makes the potency exist, in this case the potency can exist before the act comes to it.

### *Notion of Substance and Accident*

Although there are those who deny the reality or knowability of substance, unless one is an idealist or an out and out sceptic (logically pursued idealism and scepticism amount to the same thing), one must recognize substance.

<sup>1</sup> This is, after all, no more than an extension of the analogy of proportionality which we understand in all *being*. The similarity comes from the like proportions of potency and act. The difference is in the way the various potencies are related to their acts.

<sup>2</sup> S.T. I, 77, 6c. St. Thomas here explains the difference between a substantial and an accidental form. It is important to bear this distinction in mind throughout the discussion.

You cannot enunciate a proposition without admitting substance, just as you cannot believe that anything exists without forcing yourself to concede that substance exists. It is more than likely that a denial of substance in most cases arises from a misconception.

Substance is not susceptible of strict definition—only a species can be strictly defined, and in no sense is substance a species; it is a supreme genus.<sup>3</sup> The fact that it cannot be strictly defined is perhaps responsible for the many false definitions which have been given for it. We must always bear this in mind when we read modern philosophers who speak of substance. We see them calmly reject it as an absurdity only to find that they are talking of the substance of Spinoza or Leibniz or Kant, rather than the Thomistic concept of substance. According to St. Thomas substance is "an essence or thing to whose nature it belongs not to exist in a subject."<sup>4</sup> To define it this way does not remove all difficulties at one blow, but it does remove the inconsistencies of false definitions and give us ground for saying that all *must* admit it whether they like it or not. If things really exist (that much we can legitimately assume), they exist either with or without a subject—but even if they exist with a subject, ultimately this subject must be without a subject. This is familiar ground.

But just as it is obvious that substance exists, it is equally certain that no substance exists merely as such; it exists as we know it must, with its accidents. Now we have something else to cope with—accidents. These exist in the substance—inhere is the word; as St. Thomas says, "accidentis esse est inesse." As regards definition they are worse off than substance. Not only can accident not be defined strictly, but any particular species of accident cannot be defined without reference to its subject.<sup>5</sup> The subject does not enter into the essence of the accident but it does enter into the definition. This is obvious in the case of some accidents such as "snub" (an example beloved of Aristotle and St. Thomas). You can't define this without bringing in "nose". But all other accidents too demand the subject as part of their definition—not any particular subject but at least a subject. I can't define "white" merely as white, it must be a white this or that.

We know that being is predicated of accident and substance analogously, but with St. Thomas we must go further and say that even *quiddity* and definition when they are predicated of the two are predicated analogously—accident has a *quiddity* and definition only with respect to substance. Because it has only an incomplete essence, its definition too is incomplete.<sup>6</sup> All this would seem to lead to the conclusion that an accident is nothing at all. If the

<sup>3</sup> *In V Meta.*, lect. 8 (Cathala 877); *VII*, lect. 3 (1327). It is, of course, obvious that any species of substance we may take can be defined. It is only the notion of substance as substance which defies strict definition.

<sup>4</sup> *Quodlibet*. IX, a. 5; *Sum. c. Gent.* I, 25.

<sup>5</sup> *In VII Meta.*, lect. 3, (Cath. 1319); lect. 4 (1337); *De Ente et Essentia*, c. VII. It makes some difference whether we take the accident concretely or abstractly, but in either case the substance must form part of the definition.

<sup>6</sup> *De Ente et Ess.*, c. VII; *In VII Meta.*, lect. 4 (1337).

only things that were real were *entia quae* this would be true—only a substance can be an *ens quod*, but there is another very real being which is an *ens quo*—a principle of being. Accident is an *ens quo* whose whole being is to be in another—yet it has an *esse* of its own, not independently of the substance, but still its *esse* is not that of the substance.<sup>7</sup>

As we said before, substance and accident are to each other as potency to act. And here again we must utilize the concept of analogy, for the relation, despite its similarity, is different from other cases of potency and act. But at this point we run into difficulties. In proving that the faculties of the soul are distinct from the soul, St. Thomas makes a statement which seems to prove too much. And every explanation which is given only raises further objections in the mind.

It is impossible to admit that the power of the soul is its essence, although some have maintained it. For the present purpose this may be proved in two ways. First, because, since potency and act divide being and every kind of being, we must refer a potency and its act to the same genus. Therefore, if the act be not in the genus of substance, the potency directed to that act cannot be in the genus of substance. Now the operation of the soul is not in the genus of substance; for this belongs to God alone, whose operation is His own substance. Wherefore the Divine power which is the principle of His operation is the Divine Essence itself. This cannot be true either of the soul, or of any creature; as we have said above when speaking of the angels.<sup>8</sup>

If the genus of the potency must correspond to the genus of the act, then an accidental act demands an accidental potency. In all finite substances there is a substantial act and hence a substantial potency, but there are also accidental acts to which must correspond accidental potencies. Is the substance, then, its own accidental potency, or does it require some medium for the reception of accidental acts? If it requires a medium, must not this at least be directly united to the substance? And how can this be? These are some of the questions we must answer.

#### Types of Accidents

If we approach the situation as the logician does, we find a solution for our difficulty. For him there is a medium between accident and substance—the *proprium*.<sup>9</sup> But we are looking at this from the point of view of the metaphysician. Can we solve the difficulty without appealing to Dialectics? Is there anything in the ontological order which corresponds to the distinction between *proprium* and accident in the logical order? We think so.

Everything which exists must be either a substance or an accident, but there are accidents and accidents. There are some which are absolutely necessary if a given substance is to exist—they are not parts of the essence, but wherever the essence is there are these accidents. They follow the species—they correspond to the *accidens proprium*.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>7</sup> *4 Sent.*, d. 12, 1, 3, ad 5; *Sum. c. Gent.* IV, 14; *S.T.* III, 17, 2c; *De Ente et Ess.*, c. VII.

<sup>8</sup> *S.T.* I, 77, 1; cf. 1 *Sent.*, d. 3, 4, 2 resp.; *In I Physic.* lect. 14.

<sup>9</sup> *S.T.* I, 77, 1, ad 5, ad 7.

<sup>10</sup> St. Thomas draws a distinction between two kinds of properties: those which are necessary "simpliciter" and those which are necessary only "ut in pluribus". Only the first of course is absolutely necessary, but since the second is founded on the first, we treat the subject here without making the distinction.

There are others which may or may not accompany a substance without affecting the essence of the substance. These are accidents of the individual and correspond to the *accidens logicum*. These also may be of two kinds: separable or inseparable. A thing may be white or round or hard, but no one would say that it couldn't cease to be white or round or hard. These are separable accidents. A living thing may be male or female—it need not be either of necessity—but whichever it is it cannot cease to be that. These are inseparable.<sup>11</sup>

Now there is nothing to prevent us from using this distinction of accidents to explain the union of substance and accident. In fact we are forced to use it if we are going to explain at all.

A substance must be able to act if it is to attain its end. It need not always be acting but it must always be able to act.<sup>12</sup> This capability of acting we call a potency, but this is not something substantial, but accidental. Every substance, whether it be animate or inanimate, immaterial or material, must have these potencies by which it is able to act and to attain its end. By the mere fact that it is a substance and has the act of existence it must have these accidents. A living substance cannot be unless it has the capacity of fulfilling its purpose in existing. This it does by means of its faculties. A bodily substance cannot be unless it has the means of attaining its end—which it does by means of its extension which is necessary to it. Even God could not create substances without these powers. Herein the distinction between the two types of accidents is brought out more clearly. Both the act (*agere*) and the ability to act (*potentia*) are accidents (they are not parts of the essence of the subject). The act may be absent from the subject; the ability to act may never be absent. As accidents, both equally fulfill the office of perfecting the capacity of the substance. But as different types of accidents one performs the function of a *potency*, while the others have the role of *act*.

### The Orders of Being

If this explanation solves one difficulty, it only makes the other stand out more sharply. Granted that the accidental potencies act as a medium between the substance and its *other* accidents, still these potencies too are accidental forms, and how can they be united directly to the substance? If potency and act must be in the same genus, how explain the apparent contradiction of a potency which is substance receiving an act which is accident? It is here that we must interpret the question in the light of the whole theory of act and potency. If we bear in mind that a genus is an *order of being*, we can understand that every potency can be said very truly to be in the genus of its act. Matter is potency to form and the two are in the same (essential) order of being. Essence is potency to existence

—here again we are in the same order of being. In the same way, if we consider the order of accidental determination, it is perfectly true to say that substance is in potency to its accidents, and that the act and the potency are in the same order. In the essential order, it is true, substance is *in act*, but in the accidental order it is *in potency*.<sup>13</sup> But it is not true to say that substance is potency any more than it is true to say it is act. Looking at any imperfect being in one way we can say that it *participates* in potency, just as we can say of the same being that it *participates* in act. Only prime matter is potency, just as only God is act. In neither is there any participation. Now, when we say of substance that it is in potency we must understand this to mean that it participates to some extent in the ultimate potency which is pure indetermination in every order. Prime matter is in potency to all material forms, but not all directly. It must be determined by some in order to be capable of receiving others. These accidental forms, then, to some extent participate in *act* and also in *potency*, though not in the same respect. This begins, at least, to solve the problem of one substance giving rise to many accidental potencies.

### Accidental Potencies

In material beings there is no potency which cannot be reduced to the complete indetermination of prime matter. When it is determined in one line of being, matter remains in potency for other determinations. The determinations by means of which a substance is in potency to acts of another order, are accidents in the genus of these acts, and correspond, as we said, to the *accidens proprium*.

Since predication follows being, there must be some connection between the necessity of these potencies and the *per se* predication of the *accidens proprium*.<sup>15</sup> And, just as there is an analogy between the different modes of *per se* predication, the analogy must carry through here too. If I make, for instance, a series of predication of, say, man: he is capable of being extended in three dimensions; he is able to perceive sensibly objects outside himself; he is able to comprehend being under the aspect of the true, in each case I am making a predication *per se*. Yet none of them is the same as though I were to say, "He is a rational animal." Likewise, I can say of each of these predicates that it is a potency, but I mean the *is* in a widely different sense from that of "matter is potency."

It is obvious from this that there is a further question of the accidental (operative) potencies in living beings, which we call faculties.<sup>16</sup> This is not the place to go into that question, but suffice it to say that there is an analogy between them and the potencies for purely transient action. The operative potencies too must be reduced to an ultimate potency which, in the case of spiritual beings, cannot be matter.

<sup>11</sup> *Quaest. de An.*, art. 12, ad 7; *De Ente et Ess.*, c. VII.

<sup>12</sup> Augustine Osugiach, "The Problem of Substance II", *New Scholasticism*, II (1928) p. 247. He says, "A substance without activity will be altogether unknowable, meaningless, and unthinkable." We can only know a substance through its properties which are revealed by action. The properties are the potencies by which a substance can act—necessary accidents, present at all times.

<sup>13</sup> As a potency substance is essentially ordained to the act of existence (as is every *ens*). It cannot be essentially ordained to an act in the accidental order—yet it is in potency to its accidents, and to some of them directly.

<sup>14</sup> *De Spirit. Creat.*, art. 11, ad 7; *In VII Meta.*, lect 2 (1282).

<sup>15</sup> *In I Anal. Post.*, lect. 10, 14.

<sup>16</sup> *De Virt. in Comm.*, art. 1c.

*An Instrument*

What then is an accidental potency? What is its function? How does it act? It is an instrumental cause by which the substance acts.<sup>17</sup> As we said, a substance must be able to act. It is proper, for example, to a body to move with local motion, but in order to do this it must have a potency for local motion. This does not imply immanence in its action, it merely means that the object can be moved. But in saying that this potency is an instrument, we must not lose sight of the fact that it is an *ens quo*. An instrument which is an *ens quod* has its own proper effect which is raised by virtue of the principal cause, but an *ens quo* has no independent effect—its whole effect is the effect of the principal cause. It is for this very reason too that we must beware, in speaking of the potency as an instrumental cause, and as a medium between substance and certain accidents, not to conceive it as some sort of cement or glue which binds the two together. Insofar as it is an *ens quo* it is as much an accident as its act, but it has an additional function which is to determine the subject to a point where it is capable of receiving further acts.

The whole of the foregoing is admirably illustrated in the case of quantity. If we take a body (regardless of whether it is living or non-living), we find in it one proper accident which serves as a medium for all other bodily accidents. This is quantity<sup>18</sup> which flows from the very essence of the body and is present wherever body is. Other accidents such as quality, relation, etc., have their subject not directly in substance, but through the medium of quantity. Now, since each of the nine categories of accident constitutes a distinct order of being, it is true to say that one genus of accident determines the substance to be directly in potency to the next.<sup>19</sup>

*"Dimanatio" of the Accidens Proprium*

Having decided that there is an *accidens proprium* or potency by which a substance can act, which must be present wherever the substance is, it remains to be seen how this accident gets there. Does the substance produce it, or is it the result of the action of some exterior agent? Part of this is a question of causality which will be treated in the next section, but part of it is the very tantalizing question of the "dimanatio" of the *accidens proprium* from the substantial essence.

This is a question for which it is difficult to find an answer even in St. Thomas. The *accidens proprium*, he tells us, is produced, not by any direct action, but as a kind of natural result of the production of the substance. Since they are accidents not of the individual but of the species, and since they are not such that they can come or go while the essence remains the same, it follows that they are concomitants of the substantial form and exist in virtue of it. That which gives the substance being at the same time brings into being these modifications of the substance. Every substance which exists is an individual, which means that it is not merely substance but this par-

ticular substance, and of a particular kind. That which makes it this particular kind of substance is its substantial form, but in order to be this kind of substance it must be able to perform the operations which are peculiar to its species (*operatio sequitur esse*). Now it is just these potencies (*propria*) which permit this kind of substance to act as such. Therefore that which produces the substance must produce with it these qualities.

.... Now it is obvious that the subject and the *proprium* flow in the same order, for when one is generated so is the other, and when one corrupts so does the other; although not in the same grade, since the subject is first and the *proprium* follows upon it. But the substance and the contingent (not proper) accident do not belong to the same order of production.<sup>20</sup>

Certainly, if this were not so, there would be no way of knowing substances. The only way we have of knowing potencies is by the acts to which they are ordained;<sup>21</sup> and the only way we have of knowing substance is by the potencies which are its properties. But of what avail would it be to know the properties, if we could not be sure that they are necessarily connected with their subject, and can give us certain knowledge of the substance from which they flow?

*Causality<sup>22</sup>*

Something remains to be said about the causality that a substance exercises with regard to its accidents, which means that a book remains to be written. We have already treated one aspect of this problem but not precisely as a question of causality. If the treatment here is brief and unsatisfactory, it must not be blamed entirely on the limitations of space; much of it is due to the limitations of the author. It is difficult too to find a satisfactory explanation in the text of St. Thomas and the commentators.

To say that substance is the cause of its accidents is true, but it is not saying much. There are four causes and various divisions of accidents; which makes the question of causality complicated. In speaking of any union of potency and act we usually refer to the potential element as the *pars determinabilis*, and to the active element as the *pars determinans*. Looked at from this point of view, the substance, as subject for its accidents, is their material cause. (Although the substance is not the subject for all its accidents immediately, ultimately it is.) From this it follows that accidents are individuated by the substance in which they inhere.<sup>23</sup> Since in themselves they are act, they must be limited by a potency. A formal cause need not be sought for. The accidents are forms, and as such are the formal cause of the substance being *such as it is*. Efficient and final causes present greater difficulties.

Inasmuch as the accidents are ordained to perfect the substance, their final cause is the substance itself.<sup>24</sup> The

<sup>20</sup> Cajetan *In Summam Theologicam*, I, 77, 6, VI.

<sup>21</sup> S.T. I, 77, 3.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. R. Jolivet, *La Notion de Substance*, Beauchesne, Paris, 1929, pp. 52-56. The author gives a clear but very brief exposition of the question of causality. He can do little more than translate the relevant passages from St. Thomas, with a brief commentary.

<sup>23</sup> *In VII Physic.*, lect. 7.

<sup>24</sup> S.T. I, 77, 6, ad 2; Cajetan *in eundem*, VIII.

<sup>25</sup> *In VII Meta.*, lect. 7 (1418-23, 31); *De Pot.*, 3, 8c; S.T. I, 65, 4c.

<sup>26</sup> Vid. note 24.

<sup>17</sup> *De Spirit. Creat.*, art. 11c; *Quaest. de An.*, art. 12c.

<sup>18</sup> *In V Meta.*, lect. 15 (983).

<sup>19</sup> *De Ver.*, 14, 5c.

very purpose of their being is to be in a substance and to complete the capacity of the substance accidentally. Besides, operative potencies have for a finis the object or term to which their action is essentially ordained. It is the way we know them. Immediately their finis is action, mediately it is the term of the action.

In speaking of efficient causality, we must bear in mind a caution which St. Thomas repeats again and again. The efficient cause does not produce forms, it educes them from the potency of the subject.<sup>25</sup> Forms are merely the *principles* (*entia quibus*) by which the substance comes to be such as it is. The term of an efficient cause is a supposit and only a supposit—forms are caused *per accidens*. With this in mind, we can say that the efficient cause which produces the substance produces it with the properties which are peculiar to that species of substance—a sort of *con-generation*. Nevertheless, the substance does exercise some sort of active causality with regard to its proper accidents.<sup>26</sup> As we said in a previous section, they flow from

the essence of the substance. Then too, if we consider other accidents as the *operatio* of the potencies of the subject—there is active causality here too, inadequate perhaps, but still real. When a subject acts immanently, it is really the efficient cause of its own perfection. Even in the case of habits which are not the operation but rather the potency for operation (not the natural potency of which we have been speaking, but potencies for more perfect operation), the subject exercises a real efficiency.

The purpose of this last part in particular has been not so much to give a solution of an admittedly knotty problem, but rather to show that there is a problem, where the problem lies, and to indicate, if possible, in what direction we may look for a solution. St. Thomas himself would hardly think that he had said the last word on any problem (provided there is a problem). It is one of the beauties of philosophy—even the late-comers can have their say—if they have anything to say.

## Notes on Plato's Concept of Time

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**I**N THE *Timaeus*<sup>1</sup> Plato has some very interesting remarks on the question of time which afford interesting comparisons with Aristotle and present Scholastic notions. This discussion is suggested by a statement of A. E. Taylor, in his essay on Saint Thomas Aquinas, that, all through the Middle Ages, until the thirteenth century, Plato's *Timaeus* was the "only work of real value on what we nowadays call science. . . ."<sup>2</sup> Until Aristotle began to be translated and studied more seriously, scholars had to rely on the *Timaeus*, which certainly does not read like a scientific text-book.

I am ignorant of what real work was done during the earlier Middle Ages on the question of time, but it strikes me that Boethius might have used Plato as one source for his famous definition of eternity as "complete, simultaneous, and perfect possession of unending life."<sup>3</sup> Very much earlier than that Aristotle had defined time as "the measure of movement according to priority and posteriority,"<sup>4</sup> and the terms used here by him we can find in his master, although their concepts do not agree. But let us turn to the passage in the *Timaeus* and follow Plato.

### *Time the Image of Eternity*

The universe had been created as nearly like the divine essence as possible; but the divine essence is eternal; how can the copy (the universe) be like its model in this? By

making the copy in some way eternal too. "But to bestow this attribute in its fulness on a creature was impossible."<sup>5</sup> The next best thing was to make a moving image of eternity which would come into existence when the universe was created. This image of eternity is time; it differs from its unchangeable prototype in that it moves according to number, being made up of days and nights and months and years. Plato warns us that we err when we assign past and future to the eternal essence, for these are "created species of time," that is, properties predicable only of created time. The passage reads: (Plato is speaking of the Creator of the world.)

For there were no days and nights and months and years before the heaven was created, but when he constructed the heaven he created them also. They are all parts of time, and the past and future are created species of time, which we unconsciously but wrongly transfer to the eternal essence; for we say that he 'was,' he 'is,' he 'will be,' but the truth is that 'is' alone is properly attributed to him, and that 'was' and 'will be' are only to be spoken of becoming in time, for they are motions, but that which is immovably the same can not become older or younger by time. . . .<sup>6</sup>

(Wasn't Plato's idea of the Creator very close to the Christian concept?)

The universe and time can not be considered apart; they were created together and they will perish together. This is the meaning of the sentence: "The created heaven has been and is and will be in all time,"<sup>7</sup> as is clear from the context. Lastly, the planets in the heavens, especially the sun and the moon, were created "to distinguish and to preserve the numbers of time."<sup>8</sup> These numbers, it seems

<sup>1</sup> *Timaeus*, 37C-39E.

<sup>2</sup> *Philosophical Studies*, London, Macmillan, 1934, p. 229.

<sup>3</sup> *De Consolatione Philosophiae*, V.6.

<sup>4</sup> *Physics*, IV. 11, 219b,1.

<sup>5</sup> *Timaeus*, 37B. <sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 37D-38A. <sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 38C. <sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*

to me, are time's regular divisions into past, present and future, as measurable.

This is Plato's concept of time. It is interesting to analyze it a little more carefully. Time is not eternity, because only God is eternal. That is a distinction more worthy of a Christian than a pagan. Time is the image of eternity—this is typically Platonic language—and the concept is certainly hard to grasp; for eternity is changeless, it "rests in unity," but its image is changing, involving motion according to number. We can see how Benjamin Jowett<sup>9</sup> related Plato's concept to Kant's; the problem is, how can the picture of an unmoving thing move? Jowett makes Plato say it doesn't really; we only think it does, and the whole idea of time is a figment of the mind. But his interpretation has nothing in the text to support it, and on this question Plato was really the very antithesis of Kant. Kant would have time a pure creation of the human mind; Plato says distinctly that the Creator created time as some sort of image of his own eternity and made heavenly bodies to measure it.

How, then, account for the idea of motion? It seems to be impossible to justify it; we are forced to accuse Plato of lack of clarity here, as often in his writings. He is fond of speaking of this world—we see it often in his theory of ideas in the *Republic*—as a picture, a replica, an imitation, a shadow or an image of the eternal world. He uses such terms because they most nearly approximate his thought. Everything we see around us, artificial or natural, (he uses a chair and a bed as examples, and could speak of the wind or something in motion just as easily) is but a copy of the eternal form of the chair or bed or wind. These forms are the only real things, he insists; they are eternal and immutable. But how can the wind which moves have an immovable real form? Plato does not say, but leaves the problem there.

#### *Time an Objective Reality*

Nor does he solve it in the *Timaeus* where the concept of the forms is exactly the same as in the *Republic*.<sup>10</sup> If Jowett interpreted Plato as a realist in the latter, he had no right to regard him as an idealist in the other work, when the method and the subject are the same. We should say, in opposition to Jowett, that, to Plato, time is a real thing. But it is too real. Plato is not a Kantian idealist nor a moderate realist but an ultra-realist. Time is not motion as perceived by the human intellect, but there would be time if no man existed—objective time. For not man but time—shown by the heavens, with its sun, moon, and stars—is indispensable. The heavens are the source of the nights and days and months and years, the "parts of time." To our manner of thinking, Plato seems to be reasoning backwards. He says: The universe must imitate

<sup>9</sup> *The Dialogues of Plato, Translated into English*, Third ed. (N. Y., Macmillan, 1892,) III. 396-7. Cf. Jowett's Introduction to the *Timaeus*.

<sup>10</sup> Compare, e.g., *Timaeus*, 48E-49A, with *Republic*, VI, VII, X.

<sup>11</sup> *Timaeus*, 38B.

eternity; hence we need time; so create the sun and the moon to be its parts. We say: The universe has been created; the sun and the moon have been created; they are moving; we want to measure the movement according to past, present and future; the measure of motion which is performed by our reason we call time.

In accord with his postulates, Plato had no concept of time before creation. That he says explicitly: "Time then and the heaven came into being at the same time in order that, having been created together, if ever there was to be a dissolution of them, they might be dissolved together."<sup>11</sup> When chaos existed, there was no time, precisely because God had not yet begun to produce the divine image, the temporal universe. Our distinction between absolute time and relative time would never occur to him, although, as I remarked, he hit exactly upon the difference between time and eternity. He never expresses *verbatim* the idea of succession, though it is hinted when he speaks of past and future. But he does without a doubt require motion as an indispensable quality of time, as we have seen. Though Plato reaches it by an entirely different route, he would not hesitate to accept Aristotle's definition of time: "The measure of movement according to priority and posterity." And Boethius could have derived at least two parts of his definition of eternity from Plato—interminability and simultaneity.

#### *Plato and Aristotle*

Plato is not Aristotle and this passage on time in the *Timaeus* is a proof of the value of a distinction between Plato's religious or two-world and Aristotle's naturalist or one-world view of things. Plato keeps one eye on the supra-human, supra-sensible realities; Aristotle's whole attention is fixed on man and the world of sense. Plato argues to time from divine imitability, his pupil from man's consciousness of a succession in our thoughts, and a sense of the difference between the events of our experience. It is very interesting to note how their concepts of motion and of time led these two great minds to different opinions about the universe. Plato will have neither time nor motion nor the universe to exist forever, for that is an exclusively divine property; but for Aristotle time is eternal and hence movement also, so that the world always was and always will be. Notice how we who call ourselves Aristotelian were drawn by revelation back to an idea of the universe that is truly and peculiarly Platonic.



#### NOTICE

The new *Selective Bibliography for Scholastic Philosophy*, announced for this issue, will be published in the next (March) issue.

## A Letter from Dr. Muller-Thym

To the Editor of *The Modern Schoolman*:

In *The Modern Schoolman* last November I published a review of Mortimer J. Adler's *Problem of Species*. I now know that it has caused Mr. Adler a great deal of pain and injury—a thing which I deeply regret, and for which Mr. Adler has already personally extended his forgiveness.

I should like here to address this further word to M. Maritain, that, like many others whom his teaching

has reached I am profoundly in his debt; all I have ever been able to do is to have put its payment in the hands of Providence. The pages he wrote for the January Thomist have increased the debt of gratitude I owe him. And I trust that he will take it as a straightforward and sincere statement, uncomplicated by irony or other attitude, when I say that I thank him for having spoken.

Sincerely,

BERNARD J. MULLER-THYM.

## Book Reviews

### THE WAYS OF THINGS

Wm. Pepperell Montague

*Prentice-Hall, New York, 1940, pp. xviii + 712, \$4.00*

Anyone who wishes to read a thorough, able and appreciative analysis of this book is referred to Professor W. H. Sheldon's article in *The Journal of Philosophy* for September 12, 1940. After that article any such notice as the present, except for the advantage of brevity, is practically superfluous. While finding myself in general accord with both the compliments and the strictures there registered, I cannot but feel that Professor Montague was let off too easily on the subject of "Theology". The author of *The Ways* starts out well by calling attention to the fact that the only argument against Theism which has any semblance of rational procedure is that drawn from the presence of evil in the world. The argument is of course as ancient as man's dislike of pain, yet it can, aside from the emotional revolt, be made to have a show of reason. It is, however, leveled against the goodness, or rather the kindness, of God, not against His sheer existence. But the argument has had a definitive, philosophical answer from the time of Augustine and beyond. Montague's flagrant ignoring of that answer makes him shrink woefully in the esteem of any unbiased reader. His own substitute for God is "a Cosmic Mind."

If, as I believe, the "sentient" or "psychical" is energy in potential form and "mind" is that same sentiency organized into a system, why then the organized totality of things should be a Cosmic Mind. (p. 122)

Incidentally, we have here Montague's pet theory (which Sheldon says is something new in philosophy) that consciousness is potential energy, as opposed to kinetic. The acceptance of this naive theory is not surprising in one of the founders of the New Realism, which is more naive than even commonsense realism. The same mentality leads him to incorporate the Trinity in the material universe. But it is hard to overlook the travesty on religion, reprinted from *The New Republic*, 1924. Perhaps the periodical and the date explain the grotesque character of this "Promethean Challenge to Religion." (pp. 511, sqq.) Most of the book has been published before, and is here reproduced without the much needed revision that might have helped to save it from being—a reproach to any philosophy—dated. Even his "Alternative" to Relativity, namely his theory that the velocity of light depends on the velocity of the emitting source, a now completely discredited theory, is allowed to stand—a corpse exhumed from a dated past. It may be well to put one's scattered writings in one volume, but they were better left to sleep in the dead past if they are not, as Montague's are not, based on a sound metaphysics.

J. A. McWILLIAMS.

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### AN ESSAY ON NATURE

Frederick J. E. Woodbridge

*Columbia University Press, New York, 1940, pp. xi 351, \$3.00*

This book is not strictly philosophy, but it contains a number of essays in the current "philosophical" manner. Professor Woodbridge

says in the second sentence of his preface that he is trying "to analyze familiar and easily identifiable situations and follow the lead of the analysis." He achieves much of analysis in a pleasant, humane manner and with an approach which indicates acute observation and more than superficial consideration of things. His following of the lead of the analysis is not so successful.

There are thought provoking discussions of time, of space, of light, of language. The author is not a nominalist; he appreciates words in their relation to thought and things. He writes as a realist and deals with skepticism and idealism just as many a Scholastic philosopher does. He discusses the reality of potencies and in several instances orders passive potency (e.g. visibility) to act (seeing) with an assurance that is refreshing. Frequently he poses the question of finality, the "justification" of things. But with *why*, as with the equally deep-reaching *what* and *how* of beings, he does not go forward. He is content to stop with positivism, hardly following the lead of his analyses. The lead to intrinsic principles of change and of activity is not followed. The lead which beings give concerning the truths about being in general is disqualified as applicable to none but natural beings. Direct observation alone is admitted to be certitude and no clear status is recognized for other knowledges. The theories of science, the laws of nature, descriptions in mathematics, the ultimates of metaphysics are in effect confused. Thus the careful observations do not come to term, philosophically.

The mixture of the trivial and the very worth while in the first four chapters is grouped as man's "pursuit of knowledge." The final chapter, which still fails to integrate the *Essay*, presents the thesis that man's "pursuit of happiness" leads to the duality of the natural and the supernatural.

The author recognizes that nature has about her the character of imperfection, not adequately explaining herself. Yet this is not the lead he follows beyond nature to that which explains why things are and why they are what they are. He seems to attribute a kind of cognition to the appetitive in man. At any rate, belief in the supernatural is given a vague status apart from knowledge. "Knowledge [of the universe] is pursued for the sake of happiness . . . The question whether the pursuit of happiness is ultimately worth while . . . generates faith in the supernatural . . ." (335). "A justification of Nature which she herself does not afford is demanded. She is justified by man's faith that the supernatural is justification, and that faith is the faith that justifies him" (338). Quite inconsistently with his positivism, Professor Woodbridge is betrayed into the acceptance of several much less than scientific hypotheses concerning religion and its genesis. Disproved theories, similar to those in *The Golden Bough*, seem to be admitted as facts.

The excellences of the *Essay* do not outweigh its faults as a book of philosophy. But as a group of discussions about a number of interesting topics, the book is to be praised in several respects. There is a warmth and even a quiet humor about the work. The mellow experience of the author is evident. His ability to approach his topic from the viewpoint of the observer and the diction he accordingly

employs make for great clarity and vigor at times. Would that more philosophers were likewise skilled to make English bear the burden of their thought.

E. T. FOOTE.

### SCHOLASTICISM AND POLITICS

Jacques Maritain

*translated from the French by Mortimer J. Adler,  
Macmillan, 1940, pp. viii + 248, \$2.50*

The nine lectures reprinted here were given at the University of Chicago during the autumn of 1938. In his usual clear and precise manner, M. Jacques Maritain analyzes the ills of modern society and prescribes an indispensable remedy, integral humanism. The fatal weakness of modern democracies is their failure to recognize the full dignity of the human person. Nineteenth century democracies were based on humanism of the individual and democracy of the individual; that is, they considered individuals in society as mere material units, disregarding completely their spiritual nature and supernatural destiny. This materialistic philosophy is incapable of guiding man in the building of a society and will inevitably lead to absolute supremacy of the state or race. Unless existing democracies recognize that man is composed of body and soul and destined to an eternal life, they are doomed. Failure to recognize man's personal dignity has already wrought terrible havoc and is generating an overwhelming crisis for civilization.

Before it is too late, we must strive towards a Democracy of the Person. We must establish an organic democracy which recognizes God as the ultimate source of authority and man as possessed of certain inalienable, God-given rights. Not a part of us, but the whole man must work towards that end. Too long has there been a separation of religious and social life. The supernatural too must be brought in, because without God's grace men cannot live together in peace and harmony. In particular, Catholics must take part in real Catholic Action and then apply the principles learned to concrete social solutions. Not that the purpose of Catholic Action is to sponsor any particular political theory. Catholics must not allow their social conduct to be separated from religious inspiration. If we are to aid in establishing a new Christendom, a new temporal order inspired by Christianity, we must make use of those primary means "founded on moral or inner energy, on spiritual firmness, on personal courage, risk and suffering."

THEODORE J. WOLF.

### ST. AUGUSTINE, CONCERNING THE TEACHER and ON THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL

*Translated by  
George G. Leckie*

*D. Appleton-Century Co., Inc., New York, pp. xxxviii + 88*

It is an indication of vitality in the study of philosophy today that interest is being focused on the writings of the philosophers and on what conclusions might be drawn from their contributions to the history of thought, rather than on what other less-gifted minds thought about the philosophers. Thus, the translation of two works of Augustine, too little known because his beautiful Latin is lost upon our non-classical age, should be welcomed by every student of philosophy. For centuries Augustine has deserved to be better known and appreciated. Perhaps this little translation will contribute partially to rectify the really genuine ignorance about the great Father of Western civilization.

The translator has made a happy choice of texts for his purpose. In the *De Magistro* one meets the Platonic dialogue style, which does not appear in the later more important and better known works of Augustine. At the same time the *De Magistro* is one of the important links in the chain of Augustinian psychology and epistemology. In the other text we find one of Augustine's beautiful demonstrative essays concerning a subject which is never far from him in any of his writings.

The author presents a prefatory appreciation of the Bishop of Hippo. In his brief pages a rightfully proportioned emphasis is given

to the forces which led to his conversion. I admit, however, that the phrase "metaphysics of conversion" is at least puzzling. The central doctrine of the Doctor of Grace is given its important position; this indicates that the translator is either personally familiar with most of the writings of Augustine or has, at least, read the right books concerning him. It is also refreshing to find such a statement as the following: "There is an optimism in St. Augustine which has been distorted by later exploitations of his thought. (Could Professor Leckie have been thinking of Jansenism?) The essence of Augustinian optimism is grounded in the condition that God's gift of remedial grace allows man's imperfections to be once more relatively perfectible." In an otherwise splendid and accurate presentation of the meaning of original sin and grace through Christ, it is unfortunate to find such phrases and statements as "Man's will has been vitiated by Adam's error", and the Pelagian-sounding "everything depends upon the decision which he (i.e. man) will make or not make to further in himself the illumination of God's image which is situated in the interior man."

The translation is substantially correct. The author purposely strives for accuracy rather than literary grace. In the preface, it seems that the author gives undue emphasis to the importance of Augustine the rhetorician as a clue to an understanding of him. He is perfectly correct in placing Augustine at the fountain-head of the stream of scholastic tradition, but is not always clear nor accurate when he uses scholastic terminology.

FRANCIS J. O'REILLY.

### ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, CONCERNING BEING AND ESSENCE

*Translated by  
George G. Leckie*

*D. Appleton-Century Co., Inc., New York, pp. xliv + 47*

The purpose of the author in this neat little volume deserves commendation. Realizing that St. Thomas has an important lead in the presentation of problems in philosophy and their solution, he has attempted to bring his thought from the company of Latin scholars and present it to the modern philosopher unversed in Latin. How he accomplishes his purpose, however, is a sadder story.

The translation was intended to be literal and accurate, even if awkwardness of style should result. It is literal, and in general quite readable. But eight mistakes in translation have been found besides one omission of a phrase—factors which cut down the value of the translation considerably.

In the preface the author sets out to explain and elucidate the principle concepts of the text. His insufficient background in Scholastic philosophy, however, and his penchant for analogies from grammar and rhetoric (Quintilian is for some reason cited in his bibliography) lead him to confuse rather than assist the reader in the understanding of the work. Two instances in particular may be given as manifest indication that the author is insufficiently acquainted with the philosophy of St. Thomas: On page xli he speaks of the angelic essences as follows: "they possess essence and existence, and the angelic essence is its existence . . .", whereas on page 29 of the translation the contradictory has been stated. Secondly, he recommends for the beginner *The Logic of William of Ockham* by Ernest Moody "because of its parallel doctrine, not to mention its excellent conception . . ." This indicates a misunderstanding either of St. Thomas or of the above-mentioned book.

A glossary is found at the end of the book which even more clearly indicates that although in general the words of the text are translated correctly, their meaning is frequently missed. For instance, to describe *nature* as "the operation which anything is adapted or disposed to perform" is to miss the meaning of his own translation on page 5.

Commendation, however, is due the author for approaching the task with humility, as is evident from his preface. But no doubt he will be inspired to deepen his knowledge of Scholastic philosophy before setting his sail again in the wind of doctrine.

GERALD F. VAN ACKEREN.

## THE POPE SPEAKS

Charles Rankin

*Harcourt, Brace and Co., New York, 1940, pp. xi + 337, \$2.75*

The title of this book is a perfect indicator of its contents. The first third of the book deals with Pius XII as a man, the remainder is devoted to translations of all the important messages which have come from his pen since the beginning of the war. In treating of Pius the man, the author is concerned less with the process of development which has brought him to his present excellence, than with the untiring efforts of the present Pontiff to preserve peace among nations in the European crisis that prevailed at the time of his succession to the Papacy. As a consequence little time and space are devoted to his early life. The real delineation of his career begins with his appointment as Papal nuncio to Berlin in 1917. The period extending from his election to the Papacy to shortly after Germany's invasion of Danzig is extremely detailed in its chronological account of the Pope's endeavors to secure a lasting peace. Many irrelevant details inevitably creep into such an account.

The second section of the book is composed of translations of the public utterances of Pius XII, including special messages to different countries, addresses, sermons, appeals for peace, and encyclicals. The translations are all taken from reliable sources. An Appendix is added containing five peace-documents and encyclicals of the two preceding pontiffs.

This book is not especially scholarly but should prove interesting and informative reading to those who are interested 1) in the Vatican's efforts to preserve peace; 2) in the man who is determining the Vatican's policy.

Jos. T. SHINNERS.

## SHALL NOT PERISH FROM THE EARTH

Ralph Barton Perry

*Vanguard Press, New York, 1940, pp. 159, \$1.50*

To the average American, democracy is something sacred—a value worthy of sincere devotion. But practical devotion to any cause demands consistent, sustained effort, which in turn demands a certain strength and stability of purpose. This strength and stability, in time of crisis, can hardly be more than a transient psychological orientation, unless it is ultimately grounded in unshakable intellectual convictions, in a vivid, practical, realistic appreciation of the high aims, values, and motives inseparable from the cause.

Together with other democracies, our American institutions are facing hostile forces which have the psychological advantage of novelty and the spirit of uncritical enthusiasm. Novelty wears off, uncritical enthusiasm passes. But while they last, they have a dizzying vitality as the fate of France testifies. The leaders of the French say that the fall was due to the loss of intellectual convictions about the values involved in the conflict. No unshakable convictions—no stability of purpose; no stability—no consistent, sustained effort even at the cost of great personal sacrifice.

Ralph Barton Perry has dedicated practically his whole life to philosophical studies. Though his book gives evidence of wide reading and much study, it is disappointing. The accumulated knowledge of so many years is not neatly and clearly marshalled into an inflexible logical presentation of the fundamental reasons *why* "it shall not perish from the earth". Rather, that knowledge appears as a sort of intellectually entertaining side issue to the subject. Granting that democracy is not perfect, it nevertheless does include a number of altogether fundamental truths which have the soundest philosophical justification. Professor Perry does not clearly and confidently touch on these fundamentals at all; he remains on the periphery of his problem. The presentation is not sure, because it is not firmly anchored to unassailable principles.

In these critical days, complete defense is not had unless the minds of the people clearly understand and appreciate the ultimate reasons for the essentials of the democratic theory of government. In this age fighters with hazy minds are not safe against clever propaganda. Thus individual liberty is not well protected under attack, if its defenders are not convinced that their struggle is not merely *against* another ideology, but *for* something rooted in the very nature of man.

This book will not effectively contribute to this most vital need in our defense programme. It leaves the readers' mind vague and uncertain. Today if ever we need clear heads which go to the roots of things. If we are faced with a fight to the death, we must know WHY. Perhaps the author of the book is not quite clear himself as to the ultimate WHY of that which is best in our democratic form of government.

JOSEPH P. MUELLER.

## MODERN WAR AND BASIC ETHICS

John K. Ryan

*The Bruce Publishing Company, Milwaukee, 1940,*

*pp. ix + 142, \$1.75*

This little book is indeed apt for the times. Many Americans, and especially Catholic Americans, who have not the time nor the ability to wade through an involved analysis of war ethic, will delight to read Father Ryan's new book. Simplicity and clarity of thought are its special virtues. The author succeeds in presenting the scholastic doctrine on war as succinctly as the great scholastics themselves. They were interested in giving mankind an essential philosophy of war. That human nature in the twentieth century accepts that philosophy is evident from "the spontaneous and determined attempts of every people and every government engaged in war to prove that their cause is just, their intention pure and right, their methods in accordance with justice and charity." (p. 4)

This work, as its size indicates, does not pretend to be an exhaustive treatment of the subject. Only the most fundamental principles of war as the scholastics saw it, and a limited application of those principles to modern war are presented. The treatment is, however, quite adequate for the general reader. The right perspective towards war is of supreme importance. "Peace is the natural, normal, and necessary state of civil society, and its preservation is the right as well as the duty of both subjects and rulers. Only because a state of peaceful integrity and well-being belongs to a community by right of nature, has it the subsidiary moral power of using force to defend itself and to exercise the offices of vindictive justice." (p. 36) The right to peace is primary, and only when all other means to preserve it are futile is war permissible.

A well-chosen summary of scholastic ethic of war from St. Augustine, St. Thomas, Vitoria, Suarez, and others completes the first section. (p. 40) Defensive war, of course, presents no problem, while aggressive war is licit on the conditions that the cause is just, adequate, and certainly known as such; the intention right, that is, directed to peace; the declaration made by lawful authority, and the means employed in a proper manner. Special reference is made to the inviolability *per se* of non-combatants.

With the ground work laid the author turns to modern war. He chooses to submit this grim specter to an examination on three points: whether it is a last resort, or rather a permanent condition; whether any just and adequate cause, certainly known, can be assigned to it; and finally, whether one means which it employs, the attack on civil populations, can be justified. The genesis of total war, as it is so aptly called, is interestingly portrayed. It is no longer a question of the professional army, but of a whole nation fighting its war as a unit. The great progress in destructive weapons and the vastness of the armies have led to appalling loss of life and to the most acute economic distress. The facts and figures on the World War are stunning to a man who reads them for the first time. What possible good can justify this?

Father Ryan finds modern war guilty on all three points. First, the nations of today do not use it as a last resort. Peace is no longer the normal condition of society. The great prominence that war occupies in the national economy exalts it to a position that does not belong to it, and which is a real cause of actual conflict. The fundamental reason of this preoccupation with war is, of course, the absence of Christian charity and justice, the two elements that make for stable peace. Secondly, the hideous evils of modern war cannot possibly justify any appeal to it to protect a right. Of course, we must remember we are always considering aggressive war. Father Ryan seems a little too willing to exculpate the leaders of a country who declare war,

on the ground of invincible ignorance. If they are going to plunge their people into a maelstrom of destruction, they should make themselves absolutely certain of the adequate, objective justice of their cause, or of the fact that they are being attacked. Otherwise we can only say that they are morally accountable for the evils that follow. As to the last point, the direct attack on civil populations, Father Ryan cannot see how men and women and children not bearing arms or not engaged in the manufacture of weapons can be considered in the same class as actual combatants. With this any sane man will agree.

This little work is well-documented and readable. Platitudes are absent. It will well repay the reader for the hour or two that it requires. In note 6 for Chapter II, (p. 125) "art." should be replaced by "q."

ROBERT D. HUBER.

### MEDIAEVAL STUDIES

Volume II 1940

Published for The Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies by Sheed and Ward, New York, 1940, pp. 257, \$5.00

The following studies are contained in this second volume:

The Treatise De Anima of Dominicus Gundissalinus, edited by J. T. Muckle, C. S. B., with an introduction by Etienne Gilson.

The teachings of the Canonists on Usury (XII, XIII, XIV Centuries) Section IV. Punishment of Usurers. A continuation of the study begun in volume I, by T. P. McLaughlin.

Ralph Niger, *An Introduction to His Life and Works*, by G. B. Flahiff, C. S. B.

Origin and Significance of the Byzantine Iconoclastic Controversy, by Gerhart B. Ladner. A lecture delivered at the Institute of Mediaeval Studies in Toronto and at Notre Dame University, Indiana, in February 1939, with some new points and documentary evidence added.

The Canzone d'Amore of Cavalcanti According to the Commentary of Dino del Garbo. Text and Commentary edited with an historical analysis of the Commentary, by Otto Bird.

The Franciscan *Ordo Missae* in the Thirteenth Century by V. L. Kennedy, C. S. B.

Albertus Magnus on Aristotle's Second Definition of the Soul, by William Gorman.

An English Pilgrim-Diary of the Year 990, an attempt to identify the sites in the itinerary portion in the text. The diary is associated with Sigeric, archbishop of Canterbury (990-94), and is concerned with a pilgrimage from England to Rome. By Francis P. Magoun, Jr.

A Technical Construction in Old English, (*translation loans in -lic*), by L. K. Shook, C. S. B.

### LAMARTINE and ROMANTIC UNANIMISM

Albert Joseph George

Columbia University Press, New York, 1940, pp. 200, \$2.25

The author had two purposes in mind when he wrote *Lamartine and Romantic Unanimism*, and I think it will be admitted that he has accomplished both rather successfully. He chose, first, to explain Romantic Unanimism, with the hope of showing that the notion of unity played a large role in romanticism contrary to the assertion of many scholars that romanticism was concerned rather with multiplicity and change, while classicism alone held the belief in unity and the stability of things.

His second purpose was to show the development of this unanimism in France by confining the study to one man who would be an outstanding figure in his own right, while being truly representative of his times. Dr. George gives several reasons why he selected Lamartine. "In the first place, Lamartine's philosophical poetry antedates that of any other romanticist. His initiation in the doctrine of unanimism came just when romanticism was being born, and his ideas developed along with it up to the revolution of 1848. Thus, Lamartine offered the best means of investigating one phase of the ideology common in

romanticism. In the second place, he was imitative in his thinking, a more sensitive sounding board of his times even than Hugo. And thirdly, if the thesis herein proposed can be supported in the case of Lamartine, it can later be applied more easily to other romanticists."

The outline of the book follows the intellectual and philosophical growth of Lamartine's thought: his break with the Catholic Church and attempt to find in philosophy an answer for the problems that vexed him at the time; his satisfaction with the doctrine which later became known as unanimism and which looked upon the world and everything in it as "one soul in harmony"; finally in the last three chapters, the influence this Neo-platonic attitude had upon him during his years in politics, as a writer of the history of philosophy, and in the last years of his life when the French revolution threatened to destroy what he had labored to build.

This book will mean much more to the literary man than to the philosopher. There is no one who will deny that Lamartine was a great poet, but there are many who could ask with Christian Maréchal, "Lamartine, est-il philosophe?" The fact that he sought a unity amid the multiplicity of sense phenomena is surely not startling, and is by no means the infallible mark of a metaphysician. To Lamartine the universe was one great chain of being reaching from God to the smallest possible entity, embracing the animal and vegetable kingdoms and endowing them with reason and immortality. "This conception filled Lamartine with the joy of having discovered the design of the world." But a theory of being which gives reason and immortality to Lamartine's dog, to mention but a sentimental phase of the doctrine, betrays exuberance of poetic feeling, rather than philosophic thought. And feeling when not restrained and supported by a firm foundation of reason tends to the emotional extravagances so frequently to be found in the work of Rousseau, Michelet, and Victor Hugo in France, and in much of the work of Byron, Keats, and Shelley in England. But whether Dr. George is justified in speaking of Lamartine's system of thought as "Metaphysics" or not, this book should prove valuable to anyone who is interested in the development of romanticism, and in the life and work of a great French poet.

ROBERT R. LAKAS.

### SELECTIONS FROM HELLENISTIC PHILOSOPHY

Gordon H. Clark

F. S. Crofts and Co., New York, 1940, pp. viii + 267, \$1.25

With a view to filling students' needs, Professor Clark has edited six translated passages, taken from Hellenistic Philosophy. Lucretius, the Stoic Fragments, Plutarch, Philo, the legendary Hermes Trimegistus, and Plotinus comprise the group.

In the course of the various introductions by the editor, one reads with surprise that "Neo-Platonism is the culmination of all Greek philosophy" (p. 219); that

. . . as the schools of Plato and Aristotle become less important, Epicureanism and Stoicism also evince the vigor of a new life; they then become popular and stagnate, until Plotinus (A.D. 205-270) by gathering together all the strands of the Greek tradition gives late antiquity a philosophic golden age. In the meantime there had come into the world a new religious force which finally ended the Greek schools. (p. 1)

Since the above statements are evidently meant to be intimately connected with the *raison d'être* of Professor Clark's book, it is quite necessary to remark that there was only one Golden Age, one climax, one culmination of Greek philosophy: the Age of Plato and Aristotle. It follows, then, that with the close of that Golden Age, there can be only a decline. As a matter of truth, with Aristotle's death Greek philosophy lost its marvelous synthesis of speculative and practical knowledge and split into many branches. Epicureanism and Stoicism were merely two of these branches, directed to a strictly practical end. What is more, these branches, of which Neo-Platonism was but one, would all have died a natural death—as Graeco-Roman civilization would have died—had not "a new religious force" intervened. That force, Christianity, intervened not to anathematize Greek schools of philosophy but to join them in their search for truth and, when they would consent, lead them by its light.

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